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Recent Developments in
Transnational Human Rights Litigation:
A Postscript to Torture as Tort
FRANCOIS LAROCQUE*
Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives on the Development of Transnational Tort
Litigation marked the first in-depth inquiry by non-US scholars into transnationat human
rights litigation. In this article, the author canvasses a range of new developments in the
field since its publication in 2001. Of special note are five transnationat human rights claims,
decided after September 11, that were brought in Canadian and British courts. The author
mines these cases for insights into other important developments involving the American
Alien Tort Statute (Part I; corporate complicity in human rights abuses (Part II; the expansion
of common law jurisdiction to include thejus cogens crime of torture (Part 1III; state immunity
from prosecution (Part IV; and the increasing availability of compensation and other
remedies (Part V). This article is a vital update for transnationat human rights scholars.
Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives on the Development of Transnational Tort
Litigation [La torture en tant que d6Lit civil : Points de vue comparatifs sur le d6veloppement
du contentieux transnational sur tes dMlits civits repr6sente ta premiere enqu6te approfondie
effectu6e par des sp6cialistes non am6ricains, concernant te contentieux transnationat en
mati6re de droits de [a personne. Dans cet article l'auteur anaLyse une s6rie de nouveaux
d6vetoppements intervenus dans ce domaine depuis La publication de l'ouvrage en 2001. En
particulier. on note cinq plaintes transnationales relatives aux droits de [a personne qui ont
fait l'objet d'une d6cision de justice apr~s le 11-Septembre et ont 6t6 pr6sent6es aux
tribunaux canadiens et britanniques. L'auteur creuse ces affaires pour en tirer une meilteure
compr6hension des autres d6veloppements importants concernant le Alien Tort Statute
am6ricain [loi sur le droit des dMlits civils 6trangers] (Partie 1) ; [a complicit6 des grandes
Soci6t6s sur le plan des violations des droits de [a personne (Partie II) ; ['extension de ta
comp6tence du droit commun, afin d'y inclure te crime de torture jus cogens [Partie III ;
l'immunit6 de lltat 6 ['encontre de toute poursuite (Partie IV) ; et la possibilit6 croissante
d'indemnisation et d'autres recours [Partie V. Cet article constitue une mise 6 jour vitate
destin6e aux sp6cialistes transnationaux des droits de ta personne.
• Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Common Law Section, University of Ottawa. I am very
grateful to Aaron Raths for his careful research and editorial assistance and to Craig Scott for
his comments on earlier drafts of this article.
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"I would use of international law the words which Galileo used of the earth: 'But it
does move."'-Lord Denningi
PUBLISHED IN 2001, Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives on the Development
of Transnational Tort Litigation (Torture as Tort) was the first in-depth analysis by
non-US scholars of transnational human rights litigation. At the time, this
litigation was largely restricted to the United States.2 In broad terms, these are
civil proceedings in the courts of one state for violations of international norms
protecting the human person that occurred in another. In the two decades since
the seminal case of Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala (Fildrtiga), dozens of claims have
been brought in US federal courts' under a unique legislative framework
consisting of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),5 the Torture Victim Protection Act
1. Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] Q.B. 529 at 554 (C.A.)
[Trendtex].
2. Craig Scott, ed., Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives on the Development of
Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Oxford: Hart, 2001) [ Torture as Tort]. Another
notable contribution was the Human Rights Committee of ILA British Branch, Report on
Civil Actions in the English .Courts for Serious Human Rights Violations Abroad (2001) 6
E.H.R.L.R. 129 [ILA Report]. See also Franqois Larocque & Mark C. Power, Book Review
of Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives on the Development of Transnational Human
Rights Litigation by Craig Scott, ed. (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall L.J. 147.
3. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) [Filartiga].
4. See Michael Swan, "International Human Rights Tort Claims and the Experience of United
States Courts: An Introduction to the US Case Law, Key Statutes and Doctrines" in Torture
as Tort, supra note 2 at 65.
5. The Alien Tort Statute of 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 [A TS] is sometimes referred to as the Alien
Tort Claims Act, or by its numbered section of the United States Code, but here it will be
referred to as the A TS.
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(TVPA), and certain amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA).7 Pursuant to these statutes, actions have been filed against a variety of
foreign defendants, including sovereign states,8 heads of state,9 state officials,"
political organizations, 1 and multinational corporations" in relation to a
variety of international wrongs, including torture,13 terrorism, 14 genocide,"5 war
crimes,16 and extrajudicial killing.17 Transnational human rights claims have also
been brought at common law in state courts. 8 The transnational character of
such proceedings-that is, the plurality of actors, localities, and norms involved
in any given case-raises important and interlocked issues about jurisdiction,
immunity, characterization, and choice of law, as well as issues of international
relations policy and politics. Torture as Tort looked at these and other questions
in order to determine, among other things, whether US-style transnational
human rights litigation could (or Indeed should) be replicated elsewhere.
At the time of the book's publication, however, the prospects for transnational
human rights litigation in countries such as Canada or the United Kingdom
(UK) were, more than anything else, little more than an interesting academic
possibility. Both jurisdictions had known only one case each in which foreign
plaintiffs had sought to obtain a civil remedy for extraterritorial human rights
violations. The English case is A1-Adsani v. Kuwait,9 where a Kuwaiti national
6. Torture Victim Protection Act of1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 [TVPAI.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1605-1607.
8. See e.g. Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cit. 1992).
9. See e.g. Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D. N.Y 1994).
10. See e.g. Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11 th Cit. 1996).
11. See e.g. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) [Tel-Oren].
12. See e.g. Aquinda v. Texaco, 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D. N.Y. 1996).
13. See e.g Fildrtiga, supra note 3.
14. See e.g. Tel-Oren, supra note 11.
15. See e.g. Kadi v. Karadzil, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) [Kadicl.
16. See e.g. Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1985) [Handel].
17. See e.g. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987) [Forti].
18. See e.g. Alomang v. Freeport-McMoran Inc., 718 So. 2d 971 (La. C.A. 1998).
19. (1996), 107 I.L.R. 536 (C.A.) [A!-Adsani (1996)]. See the discussion of A1-Adsani (1996) in
Wendy Adams, "In Search of a Defence of the Transnational Human Rights Paradigm: May
Jus Cogens Norms be Invoked to Create Implied Exceptions in Domestic State Immunity
Statutes?" in Torture as Tort, supra note 2, 247; Graham Virgo, "Characterisation, Choice of
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sued his country in the UK for torture that allegedly occurred in Kuwait. The
Court of Appeal held the claim to be barred by the State Immunity Act 19782
since the statute did not contain an exception for torture. As will be seen
below, this was not the last word on the Al-Adsani litigation. The Canadian
case is Arone v. Canada (A. G.), 21 a failed attempt by a Somali family to sue the
Canadian government for the torture and killing of a relative by Canadian
peacekeepers in Somalia. When Torture as Tort was published, it seemed
unlikely that transnational human rights litigation would thrive outside the
United States.
Things have changed since 2001. The terrorist attacks in New York and
Washington, D.C. in September of that year-four months after the book's
publication-and the events that followed have dramatically polarized the
transnational and human rights landscape and discourse. Soon after September
11 (9/11), an "Axis of Evil" was singled out, a "Coalition of the Willing" was
formed, and the "War on Terror" was declared. After the Taliban was ousted
from power in Afghanistan, dozens of "enemy combatants" were shuttled to
detention facilities in Guantanamo Bay, where many still remain. The Bush
administration then turned its attention to Saddam Hussein's "weapons of mass
destruction" and, later, to the liberation of the Iraqi people. Without Security
Council approval, and to the international community's "shock and awe,"
armed forces led by the United States and UK marched into Baghdad. Iconic
scenes of toppled bronze statues were soon overshadowed by grizzly
photographs of US soldiers subjecting Iraqi detainees to cruel, inhumane, and
degrading treatment in the Abu Ghraib prison. In the United States, concerns
about the straining of civil liberties in the name of homeland security, under
Law and Human Rights" in Torture as Tort, supra note 2, 325; and Muthucumaraswamy
Sornarajah, 'Linking State Responsibility for Certain Harms Caused by Corporate Nationals
Abroad to Civil Recourse in the Legal System of the Home State" in Torture as Tort, supra
note 2, 491.
20. State Immunity Act 1978 (U.K.), 1978, c. 33.
21. 6 July 1999, unreported (Ont. Gen. Div.). See the discussion of Arone in Craig Scott,
"Introduction to Torture as Tort: From Sudan to Canada to Somalia" in Torture as Tort,
supra note 2, 3 (Scott, Introduction]; John Terry, "Taking Fildrtiga on the Road: Why
Courts Outside the United States Should Accept Jurisdiction Over Actions Involving
Torture Committed Abroad" in Torture as Tort, supra note 2, 109; and Chanaka
Wickremasinghe & Guglielmo Verdirame, "Responsibility and Liability for Violations of
Human Rights in the Course of UN Field Operations" in Torture as Tort, supra note 2, 465.
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the aegis of the USA Patriot Act,22 were substantiated when US officials
detained and "extraordinarily rendered" Canadian Maher Arar to Syria, where
he was jailed and tortured for a year.23 Amidst reports of internationally
wrongful conduct by US officials and mystifying support for the legality of
torture from high-profile academics,2" US courts have continued to entertain
claims against foreign defendants for extraterritorial human rights violations
under the ATS and TVPA. Indeed, as will be further discussed in the next part,
in 2004 the United States Supreme Court upheld the applicability of the ATS
to such violations, albeit with important constraints.
Another important development was the establishment of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) on 1 July 2002. The complementariry principle on which
the court is based will condition the way judges, lawyers, and scholars think
about transnational human rights litigation. The jurisdiction of the ICC is
complementary to the criminal jurisdiction of national courts; it may only
exercise its powers if national courts are unwilling or unable to carry out
criminal investigations and prosecutions.2' The subsidiary nature of the ICC's
jurisdiction rests on two rationales. The first is to avoid inundating the ICC
with cases from all over the world. States should have the first opportunity to
prosecute international criminals, given that it is their duty to do so.
26 Second,
22. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
23. The Arar Commission published its final report in September 2006. Arar Commission,
Report on the Events Relating to Maher Arar (18 September 2006), online: <http://epe.lac-
bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher.arar/index.html>. For a detailed
timeline of the Arar affair, see "CBC News In Depth: Maher Arar" CBC News (26 January
2007), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/arar/>.
24. See e.g. Alan Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
But see Jeremy Waldron, "Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House"
(2005) 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1681. See also Franqois Larocque, "Opening Statement: The
choice of torture" The Lawyers Weeky 23:1 (2 May 2003).
25. Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) at
348-61. See also Antonio Cassese, Paolo Gaeta & John R. W. D. Jones, eds., The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002) atc. 18.1.
26. For example, the preamble to the treaty establishing the ICC includes the words, "[r]ecalling
that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for
international crime." Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3 [Rome Statute].
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the ICC's complementary jurisdiction is respectful of each state's sovereignty.
The ICC will not usurp the jurisdiction of a state that is willing and able to
conduct a proper and fair trial under one of the usual jurisdictional grounds
(e.g. territoriality, nationality, or universality). In short, complementarity is
about deference to a state's power and duty to place its national laws and judicial
system at the service of the international community by prosecuting and punishing
acts that threaten world public order. From a transnaiional perspective, it is
conceivable that the complementarity of national and international criminal
jurisdiction might eventually be brought to bear in the civil sphere as well. The
new era of international criminal justice under the banner of the ICC promises
to alleviate important lacunae in law enforcement by not only addressing the
international public interest in punishing and deterring war crim es and genocide,
but also by making provision to address the private interests of the victims of
those wrongs. By importing certain features of civil procedure, such as permitting
the participation of victims in the proceedings" and allowing for the compensation
of victims upon sentencing," the ICC represents an ambitious experiment that
may yield a fuller, more complete form of international justice.
It is also significant that five new transnational human rights claims have
been brought, since 2001, in Canadian and British courts." All five claims have
been initiated at common law-which is not surprising, given the absence of
legislation like the ATS in Canada or the UK-and all five claims relate to
extraterritorial torture. This is significant for two reasons. First, the cases show
that, given its openness to a range of normative sources and persuasive authority,
the common law is aptly suited for the task of countenancing both private
interests and public international standards." Plaintiffs bring civil claims in
27. Ibid., Article 68(3).
28. Ibid., Article 75(2).
29. The Canadian cases are Bouzari v. Islamic Republic ofIran, [20021 O.J. No. 1624 (QL)
(O.S.C.J.) [Bouzaril, aff'd (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 675 (C.A.) [Bouzari (2004)], leave to appeal
to S.C.C. refised [20041 S.C.C.A. No. 410; Saleh v. UnitedArab Emirates (2003), 15 C.C.L.T.
(3d) 231 (O.S.C.J.) [Saleh]; and Arar v. Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan, [2005] 137 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 823 (O.S.C.J.) [Arar]. The UK cases are Mitchell et al. v. Al-Dali et al., Case No. A2
2004/0489 [Mitchell]; Jones v. Saudi Arabia, Case No. A2 2003/2155 [Jones]. Both appeals
were decided together: [2005] 2 W.L.R. 808 (H.C.J.), rev'd [20061 2 W.L.R. 1424 (H.L.).
30. See Mayo Moran, "An Uncivil Action: The Tort of Torture and Cosmopolitan Private Law"
in Torture as Tort, supra note 2, 661; Oliver Gerstenberg, "Private Law, Constitutionalism
and the Limits of the Judicial Role" in Torture as Tort, supra note 2, 687.
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common law courts for violations of international law because these courts can
administer both bodies of law.3 Accordingly, jurisdictional issues aside, British
and Canadian courts did not doubt that torture was actionable in tort because
of its direct incorporation into domestic law as customary international law.
32
Second, these claims in Anglo-American courts cannot be conceptually
divorced from the historical and categorical prohibition of torture at common law.
33
From its early beginnings, the common law rejected torture as being contrary to
right reason, humanity, and fundamental justice. According to Lord Bingham, the
absolute condemnation of torture and the inadmissibility of statements obtained
under torture "is more aptly categorized as a constitutional principle than as a rule
of evidence."3 In addition to being a fundamental tenet of the common law, the
torture prohibition is generally regarded as a peremptory norm of international
law from which no derogation is possible.35 This dual consecration of the torture
prohibition is not new, but is increasingly recognized by courts.3"
It is with this context in mind that this article undertakes to present and
discuss the most salient legal developments in transnational human rights
litigation since the publication of Torture as Tort in 2001. For the sake of
31. At least since the eighteenth century, there has been little doubt that "the law of nations
(wherever any question arises which is properly the object of its jurisdiction) is here adopted
in its full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land." See
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1769, Book IV (London:
Cavendish Publishing, 2001) at 67. The principles governing the relationship between
customary international law and Canadian common law were recently affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 at para. 39 [Hape]. See also
Craig Scott, "Remarks: The Alien Tort Claims Act under Attack," Proceedings of the 98th
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washingon, D. C, 2004
(Washington, D.C.: American Society of International Law, 2004) at 58 [Scott, "Remarks"].
32. See the discussion of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) [Sosa], below, at notes
48-51 and accompanying text.
33. The House of Lords recently insisted on this point when it ruled that evidence obtained
under torture in a foreign country, with or without the complicity of British authorities,
could never be admissible in English courts. See A. (F. C.) v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 AC 221 (H.L.) [A(FC)].
34. Ibid. at para. 12.
35. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, Art. 53
[Vienna Convention].
36. See e.g. Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3
[Suresh]; Sosa, supra note 32; and A(FC), supra note 33.
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convenience, the discussion is developed thematically rather than
chronologically. The most important developments involve the ATS (Part I);
corporate complicity (Part II); common law jurisdiction (Part III); state
immunity (Part IV); and compensation and other remedies (Part V).
I. THE ALIEN TORTSTATUTE
In 2004, nearly twenty five years after Fikirtiga, the US Supreme Court in Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain3 (Sosa) finally did what it had hitherto avoided: it gave its
opinion regarding the scope and purpose of the ATS.3 8 The legislation was
enacted by the First Congress in 1789 and remained dormant for nearly two
centuries until its reanimation in the Fikirtiga litigation.39 The provision that
defines the powers of the district courts is now codified at 28 U.S.C. §1350,
and it provides that "the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."4" Between the time of its enactment in
1789 and 1980, US federal courts asserted jurisdiction under the statute in only
three instances. 1
In the decades prior to the landmark decision in Sosa, legal scholars
responded to judicial comments concerning §1350's nebulous origins and
scoured the historical record in the hope of finding direct evidence of what the
first generation of US legislators had in mind. 2 None was found. What
emerged instead was a richer understanding of the legal, political, and
37. Sosa, supra note 32."
38. The Court had previously discussed the A TS in Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Republic of
Argentina, 488 U.S. 428 (1989), but only briefly and with a view to establishing its
inapplicability in transnational human rights claims against sovereign states.
39. Historically, the ATS was the fourth clause of An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the
United States, c. 20, § 9, 1 Star. 73 (1789), which established the courts of the new federal
republic and delineated their respective jurisdictions.
40. ATS, supra note 5.
41. Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C.
1795) (both admiralty cases); and Adra v. Cliff, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D.C. Md. 1961) (child
custody dispute involving fraudulent passports).
42. Prior to Fildrtiga, Judge Friendly compared the A TS to "a kind of legal Lohengrin" in ITT v.
Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001 at 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). Judge Bork noted in Tel-Oren, supra note 11 at
812, that "historical research has not yet disclosed what section 1350 was intended to accomplish."
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philosophical context in which the ATS was enacted, albeit with no clear
consensus on the best account. On the basis of this scholarship, some
speculated that § 1350 was passed to prevent denials of justice to aliens living in
the United States by facilitating their access to federal courts, thus reducing the
risk of reprisals from foreign powers." Others theorized that the ATS was more
specifically aimed at ensuring swift and proper redress for injured foreign
ambassadors and diplomatic personnel, again with a view of avoiding foreign
reprisals." Others took the more optimistic view that §1350 was the founding
generation's means of ensuring that international law would be applied and
enforced in the new republic, not solely out of some Hobbesian concern for
national security, but chiefly as a matter of national honour and duty in
fulfilling the responsibilities of statehood. 5
Quite apart from scholarly debate over its origins and purpose, the specific
scope of the ATS needed clarification. By 2004, some disagreement still
lingered on a key issue of interpretation of the ATS: whether it provided
plaintiffs with a private cause of action. Judge Bork of the D.C. Circuit read the
ATS exclusively as a jurisdictional grant, which would require plaintiffs to
invoke an explicit, legislated cause of action when seeking a remedy in federal
courts." By contrast, every other judicial circuit that considered the issue held
the ATS to confer a cause of action and to grant jurisdiction.7 That said, not
all circuits that have addressed the ATS have considered the issue; at best, those
circuits have implicitly assumed that the ATS had this double function.
In Sosa, the Supreme Court went some way toward resolving the historical
and substantive uncertainties surrounding the ATS."8 In 1990, the federal Drug
43. See e.g. Kenneth C. Randall, "Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries
into the ATS" (1985) 18 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1; William R. Casto, "The Federal Courts
Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations" (1986) 18
Conn. L. R. 467.
44. Judge Bork championed this theory in Tel-Oren, supra note 11 at 813-16.
45. Anne-Marie Burley, "The ATS and the Judiciary of 1789: A Badge of Honor" (1989) 83
A.J.I.L. 461.
46. Tel-Oren, supra note 11 at 801.
47. See e.g. Handel, supra note 16; Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir.
1994) [Hilao]; Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Fla. 1994); and Xuncax v. Gramajo,
886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995).
48. Sosa, supra note 32.
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Enforcement Administration (DEA) hired a group of Mexican mercenaries to
apprehend another Mexican national (Alvarez-Machain) believed to have taken
part in a DEA agent's torture and murder in the 1980s. The mercenaries
kidnapped Alvarez-Machain in Mexico and flew him to the United States,
where he was arrested and taken into custody by federal agents. After he was
acquitted of the criminal charges against him, Alvarez-Machain brought a civil
action in federal courts against the United States, several DEA agents, and the
Mexican mercenaries, which included one Jose Francisco Sosa. While the
'claims against the United States and DEA agents were brought under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 9 the claim against Sosa rested on the ATS. Alvarez-
Machain invoked several causes of action but the central one for our purposes
was for the human rights tort of arbitrary detention.
The Supreme Court unanimously accepted that the ATS granted the
federal courts jurisdiction to hear a limited category of claims defined by the
law of nations and recognized at common law.5" Referring to the perceived
necessity in 1789 to make some elements of the law of nations actionable for
the benefit of foreigners, Justice Souter explained for the court: "The anxieties
of the preconstitutional period cannot be ignored easily enough to think that
the statute was not meant to have a practical effect."51 In short, the statute
provided jurisdiction while the common law provided the cause of action. The
Court recalled that it was as axiomatic in the eighteenth century as it is today
that the law of nations forms part of the law of the land.52 As such, the First
Congress would not have created a separate federal cause of action for "torts in
violation of the law of nations," as "the law of nations" was considered to be
part and parcel of the common law. 3
The judges disagreed, however, on the present scope of the ATS. All nine
justices agreed that the First Congress probably "intended the ATS to furnish
jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of actions alleging violations of the law of
nations,"" which, at the time, would have included the archetypical international
49. Federal Tort Claims Act of1946, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2007).
50. Sosa, supra 32 at 712.
51. Ibid. at 719.
52. Blackstone, supra note 31 at 67.
53. A TS, supra note 5.
54. Sosa, supra note 32 at 720.
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offences of piracy, violations of safe conducts, and offences against ambassadors.
These international norms were enforceable at common law.55 But the judges
parted ways on the question of whether contemporary federal courts have the
power to recognize further actionable violations of international law beyond the
historical paradigms. Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas) held that the court's holding in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomkins-that
"there is no federal common law" 56-precluded that possibility. For its part, the
majority held that while the federal common law had been reduced to specialized
enclaves, there still existed a residual judicial discretion to recognize new
actionable international human rights violations as part of the common law.
The majority stated: "For two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law
of the United States recognizes the law of nations. ... It would take some
explaining to say now that federal courts must avert -their gaze entirely from any
international norm intended to protect individuals.
'"5 7
The Court cautioned, however, that federal judges must be slow to recognize
new international causes of action for at least five reasons. First, courts must be
mindful of the changed understanding of the common law since the time of the
enactment of the ATS. Second, the power of federal courts to create new common
law rules has also changed since the eighteenth century. Third, the unknown
collateral consequences of creating a new international cause of action counsel
prudence. Fourth, courts must consider the foreign relations consequences of
finding extraterritorial wrongs to be actionable under the ATS, since entertaining
such suits can interfere with the conduct of foreign relations by the executive.
Finally, courts have no clear legislated mandate to seek out and define new and
debatable violations of the law of nations. 58 Despite these concerns, the Supreme
Court held that the doors of the common law were still open to the judicial
incorporation of new actionable international norms, "subject to vigilant
doorkeeping" by federal courts.5 9
Without explicitly defining the criteria for new causes of action, the Court
indicated "that federal courts should not recognize private claims under federal
55. Blackstone, supra note 31 at 67.
56. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) at 78.
57. Sosa, supra note 32 at 729-30.
58. Ibid. at 722-28.
59. Ibid. at 729.
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common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite
content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms
familiar when §1350 was enacted, i.e., piracy, assault upon ambassadors and
passport violations."6 The majority did not go on to give examples of violations
that would satisfy the threshold test, though it did cite with apparent approval the
standard developed by lower courts: that "actionable violations of international
law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory."61 Invoking
this standard, lower courts had asserted jurisdiction under the ATS in claims for
torture, genocide, war crimes, extrajudicial killing, and slavery.62 While arbitrary
detention was held to be actionable by lower courts in other instances, 63 the
Supreme Court held in Sosa that "a single illegal detention of less than a day,
followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt
arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law so well defined as
to support the creation of a federal remedy.""
In the wake of Sosa, federal courts and scholars have been trying to
understand when an international norm will be actionable under the ATS.65 As
recent developments show, however, the Sosa standard has proved generally
unhelpful and has produced peculiar results in the ATS jurisprudence.
60. Ibid. at 732.
61. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467 at 1475 (9th Cit. 1994)
[Marcos Estate].
62. See Filartiga, supra note 3 (torture); Handel, supra note 16 (war crimes); Kadi', supra note 15
(genocide); Forti, supra note 17 (extrajudicial killing); and Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F.
Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999) (forced labour).
63. See e.g. Forti, ibid.; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin SA, 978 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
[Eastman Kodak].
64. Sosa, supra note 32 at 738. Note, however, that a post-Sosa decision has found "prolonged"
arbitrary detention to be actionable under §1350. See Doe I v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258
(N.D. Cal. 2004) [Liu Qi].
65. See e.g. Beth Stephens, "Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: the door is still ajar for human rights
litigation in U.S. Courts" (2004) 70 Brooklyn L. Rev. 533; Franqois Larocque, "ATS
Survives the Supreme Court" (2004) 63 Camb. L. J. 532; Zachary S. Kahn, "How Far is
the 'Door Ajar': Whether Rape as Torture is Actionable under the ATS after Sosa" (2006)
12 Cardozo J. L. & Gender 685; Carolyn A. D'Amore, "'Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the
ATS: How Wide Has the Door to Human Rights Litigation Been Left Open?" (2006) 39
Akron L. Rev. 593; and Igor Fuks, "Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future of ATCA
Litigation: Examining Bonded Labor Claims and Corporate Liability" (2006) 106 Colum.
L. Rev. 112.
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The first case to follow Sosa was In re South African Apartheid Litigation,+ a
class action filed by South African nationals against a group of multinational
corporations for having aided, conspired with, and benefited from apartheid.
Justice Sprizzo declined to broaden the scope of the ATS to include private
liability for aiding and abetting violations of international law. He stated: "[The
ATS] presently does not provide for aider and abetter liability, and this Court
will not write it into the statute. In refusing to do so, this Court finds this
approach to be heedful of the admonition in Sosa that Congress should be
deferred to with respect to innovative interpretations of that statute. '"7
Corporate complicity in human rights violations forms the basis of claims that
will be discussed in the following part.
Two further cases suffice to illustrate the post-Sosa malaise experienced by
federal' courts charged with the task of ascertaining whether an alleged
international wrong is actionable at common law through the ATS. The first is
Aldana v. Del Monte, 8 involving proceedings against the Del Monte
corporation regarding alleged human rights abuses in Guatemala. Specifically,
the plaintiffs claimed that corporate officials directly ordered the kidnapping,
detention, and torture of trade union representatives. This conduct, the plaintiffs
alleged, amounted to violations of the international rights to be free from torture,
arbitrary detention, cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment, and the right to
associate and organize. The Southern District Court of Florida dismissed the
claims in 2003 because of the poor evidentiary record and the plaintiffs' failure
to show that the alleged misconduct amounted to violations of international law. 9
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and reversed the decision in part,
upholding the claims for torture, but dismissing the claims in relation to the
right to associate and organize, and the right to be free from cruel, inhumane,
and degrading treatment. With respect to this last holding, the court held that
the international prohibition against cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment
did not possess the normative specificity that Sosa requires to be actionable under
66. 346 F. Supp.2d 538 at 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) [South African Apartheid Litigation].
67. Ibid. at 550.
68. Aldana v. DelMonte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242 at 1247 (1 1th Cir. 2005)
[Aldana (2005)]. Dismissed in U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77020 (S.D. Fla. 2007) on forum non
conveniens grounds.
69. Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, N.A. Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (S.D. Fla 2003).
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the ATS. The court acknowledged that its holding was contrary to at least two
pre-Sosa district court decisions on that point."0 Surprisingly, the Eleventh
Circuit distinguished those cases on the basis of their reliance on the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which the Sosa court found did
not "create obligations enforceable in the federal courts."71
The grounds invoked by the Eleventh Circuit in distinguishing the relevant
precedents from the case before it are more than a little suspect. While both the
Mehinovic and Cabello decisions cited the ICCPR as evidence of the
well-established and well-defined nature of the international norms at issue in
those claims, neither case turned solely on the ICCPR."2 It was disingenuous
and arguably an error of law to focus primarily, as the Aldana decision did, on a
single feature of the pre-Sosa precedents instead of engaging with their merits in
light of the Sosa standard.
The decision in Aldana not to recognize cruel, inhumane, and degrading
treatment as actionable under the ATS is symptomatic of the post-Sosa malaise.
While the Sosa standard admittedly leaves much to be desired in terms of clarity,
ii generally endorses the stringent threshold established in Filirtiga and its
progeny, namely that the reach of the ATS ought to be limited to "a handful of
heinous actions-each of which violates definable, universal and obligatory
norms." 3 That being so, it is difficult to imagine another international norm as
"definable, universal and obligatory" as the prohibition against cruel, inhumane,
and degrading treatment, particularly in light of that norm's connection to the
prohibition against torture in the Convention against Torture.7" Nevertheless, in
70. Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 at 1347 (N.D. Ga. 2002); Cabello v.
Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345 at 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2001), affirmed on different
grounds by 402 F.3d 1148 at 1161 (11 th Cir. 2005).
71. Sosa, supra note 32 at 735.
72. In both cases, the courts looked to a variety of international legal sources to assess the validity of
the plaintiffs' daims, including customary international law and a number of multilateral treaties.
73. Sosa, supra note 32 at 732, quoting Judge Edwards's concurrence in Tel-Oren, supra note 11
at 781. The court also referred to the decisions in Fildrtiga, supra note 3 at 888 and Marcos
Estate, supra note 61 at 1475, holding that actionable violations of international law must be
of a norm that is "specific, universal, and obligatory."
74. Convention Aagainst Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted 10 December 1984, GA Res. 39/46, UN GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No
51, UN Doc. A139/51 (1985), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987)
[Convention Against Torture].
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2006 a majority of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en
banc, upheld the 2005 decision and denied a rehearing of the case on this point.
7 5
Judge Barkett dissented in strong terms, citing scores of weighty authorities-
case law, multilateral treaties, resolutions, and doctrinal writing--evincing the
well-established, and well-defined nature of the prohibition against cruel,
inhumane, and degrading treatment.76 Judge Barkett took the view that the
majority misapprehended the Sosa standard:
Had the panel followed the required Sosa analysis, it would have seen that the specific
content requirement of Sosa is not one of categorical specificity--it does not require
defining every possible instance of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment, but rather compels a determination of whether the facts alleged in a
particular situation sit within the universal prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment.
77
Judge Barkett's dissent reliresents an earnest attempt to distill the Sosa
standard into a workable approach, something the majority of the court and the
2005 panel failed to do. That being said, holding that Sosa requires something
less than "categorical specificity" in defining the content of an actionable
international norm does not provide much additional guidance. Indeed,
determining "whether the facts alleged in a particular situation sit within [a
given] universal prohibition" is not the same as comparatively assessing the
specificity of the norm at issue to the eighteenth-century paradigms of piracy,
assault against ambassadors, and violations of safe conduct, which is clearly the
task invited by the Sosa standard. In any event, the dissent in Aldana strikingly
highlights Sosa's shortcomings.
Another case that illustrates the judicial difficulties in giving meaningful
effect to the test articulated in Sosa is Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, where
Nigerian plaintiffs sued Royal Dutch Petroleum (RDP) in relation to alleged
environmental and human rights abuses stemming from the corporation's
activities in the Niger delta." The complaint listed seven counts of international
human rights breaches on the part of RDP: (1) extrajudicial killing; (2) crimes
against humanity; (3) torture and cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment;
75. Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, NA., Inc., 452 F.3d 1284 (11 th Cir. 2006).
76. Ibid. at 1284-89.
77. Ibid. at 1288 [emphasis added].
78. Kiobelv. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 45 (S.D. N.Y. 2006) [Kiobel].
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(4) arbitrary arrest and detention; (5) violations of the rights to life, liberty,
security, and association; (6) forced exile; and (7) property destruction. The
defendant moved to strike the claims, arguing that they fell short of the standard
set in Sosa. Before discussing the effect of the Supreme Court's decision on the
plaintiffs' claims, Judge Wood reminded herself that, before Sosa, the controlling
precedent in her circuit was Fildrtiga, which sets "a high bar for holding that a
rule occupies the status of well-settled international law such that a district court
may exercise jurisdiction under the ATS."79 Judge Wood formulated the Fildrtiga
threshold as follows: "It is only where the nations of the world have demonstrated
that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of
express international accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an
international law violation within the meaning of the statute."8
Turning to the state of the law post-Sosa, she found the Supreme Court's
decision in Sosa confusing and concluded that it "provided little guidance
concerning which acts give rise to an ATS claim."81 Justice Wood then proceeded
to highlight its ambiguities by comparing the decision to Fildrtiga. She confined
Sosa to its own facts and resorted to the more familiar Fidrtiga standard as if it
were still the controlling precedent.82 It was perhaps not unreasonable to proceed
in this manner given Fildrtiga's venerable vintage and Sosa's chronic ambiguity,
but it is nevertheless an odd way to treat a Supreme Court decision.
The court went on to determine the actionability of the plaintiffs' claims
by looking to Second Circuit precedents for guidance-primarily Talisman
(2003)83 and Wiwa 8 -and paying occasional lip service to Sosa. Ultimately, the
court upheld the claims in relation to crimes against humanity, torture, and
arbitrary detention as being sufficiently well-defined at international law to
ground an ATS action, but dismissed the claims for extrajudicial killing, forced
exile, and property destruction, as well as for violations of the rights to life,
liberty, security, and association, for failing to meet that standard.
79. Ibid. at 460.
80. Ibid. (quoting Fildrtiga).
81. Ibid. at 462.
82. Ibid. at 463.
83. Presbyterian Church ofSudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp.2d 289 at paras. 320-21
(S.D. N.Y. 2003) [Talisman (2003)].
84. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., (S.D. N.Y. 2002) LEXIS 3293 [Wiwal.
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The decisions in Aldana and Kiobel are illustrations of the dissatisfaction
Sosa has produced. As the court in South African Apartheid Litigation"
commented:
While it would have been unquestionably preferable for the lower federal courts if
the Supreme Court had created a bright-line rule that limited the [ATS] to those
violations of international law clearly recognized at the time of its enactment, the
Supreme Court left the door at least slightly ajar for the federal courts to apply that
statute to a narrow and limited class of international law violations beyond those
well-recognized at that time.
86
That approach, the court continued, "relegated to the lower courts the task of
grappling with and determining what offences against international law fit within
that narrow class of offences.""7 As A/dana and Kiobel show, it is a task that is
proving more difficult than perhaps the Supreme Court itself had anticipated,
and it will likely require meaningful assistance from the Supreme Court sooner
rather than later.
The final ATS development is the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Sarei v. Rio Tinto,88 which apparently is the only judicial circuit to
approve of Sosa. In that case, residents of the island of Bougainville in Papua New
Guinea sued Rio Tinto, a multinational mining group, for its alleged participation
in violations of the laws of war, crimes against humanity, and racial discrimination,
and for violations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The
Ninth Circuit commented on the decision in Sosa, finding that the Supreme
Court had "adopted a view of [ATS] jurisdiction that is generally consistent
with the Ninth Circuit law."89 Indeed, as mentioned above, the majority in Sosa
cited with apparent approval the standard utilized by the Ninth Circuit in In re
Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation,9" to wit, that "actionable violations of
international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory."9
85. South African Apartheid Litigation, supra note 66.
86. Ibid. at 547.
87. Ibid.
88. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007) [Sarei].
89. Ibid. at 1202.
90. Marcos Estate, supra note 61.
91. Sarei, supra note 88 at 1202. See also Justice Scalia's dissent in Sosa, supra note 32 at 742,
noting that "the verbal formula ... applied [by the Ninth Circuit to determine whether
ATCA jurisdiction applies] is the same verbal formula that the Court explicitly endorses."
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In the court's view, "the settled principles of law that governed the district
court's analysis therefore remain sound post-Ssa."9 2 Pursuant to the Ninth
Circuit standard, the court went on to uphold each of the plaintiffs' claims.
Though much more could be said about this aspect of the Sarei decision,
the most noteworthy and detailed portion of its analysis related to whether the
ATS contains an exhaustion of local remedies requirement. In a footnote, the
majority in Sosa suggested that the ATS may implicitly include such a
requirement, but ultimately declined to settle the issue.93 Courts in the Ninth
Circuit have long determined the justiciability of ATS claims without requiring
the exhaustion of local remedies.9" While the issue has been raised in other
judicial districts over the years, no court has taken a firm position.95
The defendant Rio Tinto and amicus curiae (which notably included
International Court of Justice Judge Stephen M. Schwebel) argued that the
TVPA's exhaustion provision96 ought to be extended to the ATS. Such a result
would be consistent with the exhaustion requirement at international law for
human rights claims, as well as with the general policy of judicial restraint that
animates the prudential doctrines of comity, act of state,97 and political questions.
The majority in Sarei declined to do so chiefly for two reasons. First, the
TVPA's legislative history did not conclusively disclose Congress's intention on
this point. Second, the majority felt that the international principle of
exhaustion-a procedural rule premised on respect for state sovereignty-did
not necessarily compel US courts to limit the jurisdiction they possess under
92. Sarei, ibid. at 1202.
93. Sosa, supra note 32 at 733, n. 20 (stating only that the Court would consider the
requirement in an appropriate case).
94. See e.g. Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532 at 544-58 (9th Cit. 2005); MarcosEstate,
supra note 61 at 1474-76.
95. See e.g. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877 at 889-90 (7th Cir. 2005); Talisman (2003),
supra note 83 at 343-44.
96. TVPA, supra note 6, s. 2(b).
.97. The act of state doctrine, a kind of choice of law analogue to state immunity doctrine,
is a well-established doctrine in the United States but an infrequently invoked and hazily
delineated doctrine in non-US common law courts. For a discussion of act of state
doctrine in Canadian and UK courts and its relationship to the invocation of immunity by
state officials in foreign courts, see Martin Biihler, "The Emperor's New Clothes:
Defabricating the Myth of'Act of State' in Anglo-Canadian Law" in Torture as Tort, supra
note 2, 343.
LAROCOUE, TORTURE AS TORT 623
the ATS.9" Accordingly, the majority concluded that it would be inappropriate,
given the lack of direction from Congress and the Supreme Court, to introduce
an exhaustion requirement into the Ninth Circuit's existing ATS jurisprudence
where none had been required before.99 Judge Bybee dissented, stating that he
would have applied the TVPA's exhaustion requirement to the ATS on grounds
of comity and respect for foreign legal processes: "In my view, international law
requires exhaustion of local remedies as a condition to bringing an international
cause of action in a foreign tribunal. Even if international law did not so require
exhaustion, I would, as an exercise in discretion, require it as a matter of our
domestic law.""1 '
That states may determine the admissibility of foreign claims in their courts
is indisputable. Given that ATS claims are based in international customary law
and that the ATS, like all statutes, ought to be construed consistently with
international law, it could be argued that ATS claims should be conditioned by
some version of the exhaustion principle. It may equally be argued, on the other
hand, that little would be gained by requiring the exhaustion of local remedies
in ATS cases, since the international rule's policy is largely addressed by other
domestic prudential doctrines such as act of state, political questions, andforum
non conveniens. Indeed, both the exhaustion requirement at international law and
forum non conveniens at domestic law aim to strike a balance between preventing
denials of justice and ensuring that claims be determined by the most appropriate
decider. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will follow through on its intimation
that it would consider the propriety of an ATS exhaustion requirement in an
appropriate case and provide guidance on this important issue.
II. CORPORATE COMPLICITY
The issue of corporate liability for extraterritorial human rights violations receives
very limited treatment in Torture as Tort1 ' and, because of space constraints,
98. Sarei, supra note 88 at 1220 (stating that the exhaustion limitation required by international
law is not dispositive of a US court's discretion to impose exhaustion as part of the ATS).
99. Ibid. at 1223.
100. Ibid. at 1224-25.
101. See Sornarajah, supra note 19. The topic is also broached in Craig Scott, "Translating
Torture into Transnational Tort: Conceptual Divides in the Debate on Corporate
Accountability for Human Rights Harm" in Torture as Tort, supra note 2, 45 [Scott,
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this article cannot fill that lacuna by surveying nearly ten years of complex legal
proceedings. Fortunately, others have undertaken this work."2 Accordingly, what
follows is a cursory review of the broad issues, key cases, and recent developments
on this issue.
The 1995 decision in Kadi v. KaradziP15 3 marked the beginning of the
second generation of litigation under the ATS, broadening the class of potential
defendants to include non-state actors. The Second Circuit found the statute to
confer jurisdiction in proceedings against non-state actors where international
law itself defines the human rights norm at issue to be applicable to private
persons; examples include genocide and war crimes. In addition, and more
importantly for purposes of the present discussion, the court held that private
persons might also be found liable for international wrongs that require an
element of state action, such as torture or summary execution, when such
crimes are perpetrated in concert or with the support of state actors." 4 As a
threshold issue, the establishment of subject-matter jurisdiction in ATS claims
against private parties qua state actors requires that plaintiffs show that the
defendant acted under the colour of law. State action is found where a private
party conspires, aids and abets, or otherwise acts in complicity with a state
actor. In 1997, on the basis of the ruling in Kadij, the federal court for the
Central District of California allowed a claim to proceed against Unocal in ATS
proceedings related to that corporation's alleged involvement in gross human
rights violations in Myanmar."'5 Since that judgment, corporate complicity in
extraterritorial human rights violations-and the substantive criteria by which
it ought to be established under the ATS-has become one of the most
contentious and explosive issues in transnational human rights litigation.
Translating Torture]; Upendra Baxi, "Geographies of Injustice: Human Rights at the Altar of
Convenience" in Torture as Tort, supra note 2, 197; and Robert Wai, "The Commercial
Activity Exception to State Immunity and the Boundaries of Contemporary International
Legalism" in Torture as Tort, supra note 2, 213.
102. For a comprehensive overview of the topic, see Sarah Joseph, Corporations and Transnational
Humnan Rights Litigation (Oxford: Hart, 2004). Updates of this book are available on the
publisher's website: <http://www.hartpub.co.uk>. See also Craig Forcese, "ATCA's Achilles
Heel: Corporate Complicity, International Law and the Alien Tort Claims Act" (2001) 26
Yale J. Int'l L. 487.
103. Kadie, supra note 15.
104. Ibid. at 239-245.
105. Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) [Unocal].
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Although the Supreme Court in Sosa did not discuss the issue of corporate
liability (it merely raised the question in a footnote 1 6), federal courts have
overwhelmingly agreed that private entities such as multinational corporations
are capable of violating international law and incurring civil liability under the
ATS.1"7 The main issue in corporate transnational human rights proceedings, as
with all ATS lawsuits, is whether a given claim activates the subject-matter
jurisdiction of federal courts. Is the alleged human rights violation one that
corporations can, de jure, commit, and does the corresponding international
norm possess the required specificity to be actionable under the ATS? Clearly,
not every international norm meets the Sosa standard. For instance, courts have
generally found international norms prohibiting environmental damage and
pollution to fall outside the scope of the ATS.0 8 Claims alleging corporate
involvement in torture, extrajudicial killing, forced labour, and genocide, by
contrast, have been allowed to proceed." 9
However, as mentioned above, where the alleged human rights violations
are defined at international law as requiring an element of state action-as is
the case for torture and extrajudicial killing, for example-ATS jurisdiction
will only be established if plaintiffs can adduce evidence showing that the
corporation conspired or collaborated with state authorities. To this end, the
Kadi6 court pointed to "the 'colour of law' jurisprudence of 42 U.S.C.
§1983 [as] a relevant guide to whether a defendant has engaged in official
action for purposes of jurisdiction" under the ATS."' US courts have developed
several different context-specific tests to determine whether a private party
can be deemed to have acted under the colour of law within the meaning of
106. Sosa, supra note 32 at 732, n. 21.
107. See e.g. Kadi', supra note 15; Unocal, supra note 105; Eastman Kodak, supra note 63; Aguida
v. Texaco, 303 F. (3d) 470 (2nd Cir. 2002); and Talisman (2003), supra note 83. But see
South African Apartheid Litigation, supra note 66.
108. See e.g. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997) [Beanal]. See
also Flores v. Southern Peru Copper, 343 F.3d 140 (2nd Cir. 2003). See also Aguinda v.
Texaco, 303 F.3d 470 (2nd Cir. 2002) [Aguinda (2002)].
109. See e.g. Unocal, supra note 105; Talisman (2003), supra note 83.
110. Section 1983 is the cornerstone of US civil liberties jurisprudence, creating a cause of action
against any person acting under the colour of authority of the federal government or that of
the several states and who deprives another person of their constitutional rights. See KadiW,
supra note 15 at 245.
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§1983."' From these, the "joint action test" has received the widest application
in ATS proceedings.1 2 In Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum,"3 the court agreed
that "the relevant test in this case is the 'joint action' test, under which private
actors are considered state actors if they are wilful participants in joint action
with the State or its agents.""' In addition to the willingness of private actors to
act jointly with the state, the joint action test also takes into account the nature
and quality of the cooperation itself. In Wiwa, the court relied on the reasoning
in Unocal, which held that "[w]here there is a 'substantial degree of cooperative
action' between the state and private actors in effecting the deprivation of
rights, state action is present.""' The court was satisfied that the alleged
relationship between the corporation and Nigeria, if proven, would constitute
"wilful participation" and "substantial cooperative action" within the meaning
of the joint action test.
In 2002, some courts began applying international criminal standards of
complicity to ATS cases in addition to, or in lieu of, the domestic standards
suggested in Kadii."6 The first extension of international criminal law principles
to corporate complicity was Unocal. The court found that decisions by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda were "especially helpful" for
ascertaining the international law standard for aiding and abetting as it pertains
to the ATS. "7 With particular reference to the Furundzija"8 and Tadic " cases,
111. Forcese, supra note 102 at 504.
112. See e.g. Kadie, supra note 15 at 245; Beanal, supra note 108, 374-80; Talisman (2003), supra
note 83 at 328.
113. Wiwa, supra note 84. In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that Royal Dutch-Shell and Nigeria
coordinated the campaign to suppress the Ogoni people, that.the corporation provided the
Nigerian military with boats and helicopters to facilitate attacks on Ogoni villages, and that
the corporation bribed witnesses to falsify their testimony against Saro-Wiwa and paid the
military to respond violently to Ogoni complaints concerning oil spills.
114. Ibid. at 40.
115. Ibid. at 40-42.
116. See e.g. Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp.2d 1322 at 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2002); Barrueto v.
Larios, 205 F.2d 1325 at 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002); and Doe v. Unocal (2002), No. 00-56603 at
45 (9th Cir. 2002) [Unocal1].
117. Unocal II, ibid.
118. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, ICTY IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment (10 December 1998) (International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber) [Furundzija].
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and the discussion therein surrounding the constitutive actus reus and mens rea
of aiding and abetting, the court devised a "modified Furundzija standard" for
ATS purposes. As a result, corporate complicity is actionable in the Ninth
Circuit under the ATS if a corporation is shown to have provided "knowing
practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect on the
perpetration of the crime.""12 Judge Reinhardt, dissenting, would have applied
"traditional civil tort principles embodied in federal common law" to determine
the issue of corporate complicity."' When resolving ancillary issues raised by
federal grants of jurisdiction, he argued, courts have traditionally turned to the
federal common law. In his opinion, the benefit of the common law's vast
experience is lost when federal courts apply, as did the majority, "undeveloped
principle[s] of international law promulgated by a recently-constituted ad hoc
international tribunal."' 22
Though the practice of referring to international criminal concepts of
complicity and aider and abetter liability is gaining judicial approval,'23 Judge
Reinhardt's dissent in Unocal, the decision in Re South African Apartheid
Litigation, and the continuing practice of resorting to §1983 jurisprudence
indicate that the question awaits clarification from Congress or the Supreme
Court. Guidance would also be welcome regarding the relevant factors to be
considered in motions to dismiss ATS claims on the basis offorum non conveniens,
119. Prosecutorv. Tadi, ICTY IT-94-a-A, 38 ILM 1518 (1999).
120. UnocalI, supra note 116 at 48-49. The court in Talisman also derived substantive standards
of complicity from ICTY case law, arriving at a standard similar to the Unocal 1I test. In that
case, the court was satisfied that the standard would be met if the facts alleged were proven at
trial, namely, that "Talisman aided and abetted -or conspired with Sudan to commit various
violations of the law of nations; ... [that] Talisman worked with Sudan to carry out acts of
'ethnic cleansing'; that Talisman encouraged Sudan to do so; and that Talisman provided
material support to Sudan, knowing that such support would be used in carrying out such
unlawful acts." See Talisman (2003), supra note 83 at 90-91.
121. Talisman (2003), ibid. at 90.
122. Ibid. at 97.
123. See e.g. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp.2d 331
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) [Talisman (2005)]; In reAgent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 996
F.2d 1425 (2d Cit. 1993); and Liu Qi, supra note 64. See also Forcese, supra note 102;
Andrew Ridenour, "Apples and Oranges: Why Courts Should Use International Standards
to Determine Liability for Violations of the Law of Nations under the Alien Tort Claims
Act" (2001) 9 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 581.
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an issue that often arises in transnational human rights litigation involving
corporations.' 24 While some cases disclose fair and reasonable applications of
traditional principles,
125 others are disappointingly parochial in focus.
26
All the cases discussed above, some of which are ongoing, allege the
perpetration or complicit participation of multinational corporations in grave
human rights abuses. 12 Indeed, more than any other type of claim brought
under the ATS, the corporate complicity cases have yielded a considerable body
of judicial and doctrinal reflection on the procedural and substantive contours
of this statute. However, to my knowledge, not a single decision on the merits
has yet been rendered against a corporate defendant in relation to allegations of
extraterritorial human rights violations. While the sizeable settlement obtained
in 2004 by Burmese plaintiffs in the Unocal litigation heartened human rights
advocates, the 2006 dismissal of the claims against Canadian oil company
Talisman was a sobering reminder of the challenges that await plaintiffs in ATS
proceedings against corporations.
Talisman Energy is the largest Canadian oil producer, with operations on
four continents. 128 In 1998, acting through a consortium of oil companies,
Talisman acquired vast land concessions in Sudan, of which 11 million acres
were Iunder its exclusive control. In 2001, the Presbyterian Church of Sudan,
Nuer Community Development Services (a non-profit organization providing
support for Sudanese refugees living in the United States and abroad), and
several citizens of Sudan filed a class action in the Southern District of New
York against Talisman and the Republic of Sudan for grave human rights
violations. The plaintiffs alleged that Talisman assisted the Sudanese military in
ensuring the security of its oil fields and facilities. Specifically, they alleged that
124. See the critical discussion of the use of this doctrine in Baxi, supra note 101.
125. See e.g. Aguinda v. Texaco (2001), 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y.); aff'd inAguinda (2002),
supra note 108.
126. See e.g. Talisman (2003), supra note 83 (particularly the analysis of Canada as a possible
forum).
127. Aldana (2005), supra note 68; Sarei, supra note 88; and Kiobel,.supra note 78. See also Wiwa
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65601 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Bowoto v.
Chevron Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63209 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Saleh v. Titan Corporation,
436 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2006); Almog v. Arab Bank PLC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5826
(E.D.N.Y. 2007); and Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cit. 2007).
128. For a good summary of the facts and procedural history, see Talisman (2003), supra note 83.
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the corporation participated in the planning of security operations, which
included forced displacements, detention, and genocide of non-Muslim
Sudanese living in or near the Talisman oil fields. According to the plaintiffs,
Presbyterian churches were burned and thousands of villages were destroyed.
Talisman is further alleged to have facilitated the atrocities by allowing the
Sudanese military to use its infrastructure, such as roads and landing strips, to
launch raids against the local population. The plaintiffs sued under the ATS and
TVPA, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in addition to compensatory
and punitive damages.129
In 2003, Talisman's motion to dismiss the claim was rejected on all counts.3
The district court held that the alleged corporate violations of international law
were cognizable under the ATS; that personal jurisdiction flowed from the
presence of Talisman's subsidiary Fortuna in the state of New York; that all
plaintiffs had standing to bring the claim; that neither Sudan nor Canada were
more appropriate fora; that dismissal was not warranted under doctrines of
comity, act of state, or political questions; that all necessary parties were involved;
and that equitable relief was appropriate. However, in 2006, after a series of
favourable outcomes for the plaintiffs, the district court granted Talisman's
motion to dismiss the lawsuit on the grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to
show sufficient evidence that the oil company performed any act that could be
construed as substantial assistance to the government of Sudan in committing
acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.'
The most noteworthy Canadian development with respect to corporate
complicity is a lawsuit filed in the Superior Court of Quebec in early July 2008.
The municipal council of a small village situated on the West Bank sued a Montreal
corporation and its director for their role in the development of dense residential
housing in the area."3 2 In so doing, the plaintiffs allege, the corporation and its
director are "aiding, abetting, assisting and conspiring with the State of Israel in
129. Responding to mounting pressure from shareholders and human rights groups, Talisman
disposed of its oil interests in Sudan in 2002 and 2003. See "Talisman Pulls Out of Sudan"
BBC News (10 March 2003), online: < http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/business/2835 713.stm>.
130. Talisman (2003), supra note 83.
131. Presbyterian Church ofSudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
[Talisman (2006)].
132. See Sean Gordon, "Palestinian Villagers Sue Montreal Firm" The Toronto Star (11 July
2008), online: <http://www.thestar.com/article/458375>.
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carrying out an illegal purpose," namely, the creation of illegal settlements in
occupied territory, which constitutes a war crime at international and Canadian
law.133 The plaintiffs allege that the defendants' actions constitute breaches of the
Fourth Geneva Convention and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, as well as Canada's Geneva Conventions Actd" and Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes Act.3' The plaintiffs have requested declaratory relief
in the form of a permanent injunction against the corporation from participating
in the construction, sale, and marketing of settlement housing in the area, and
punitive damages under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights.'36 While it is still
very early in the proceedings, this case potentially raises groundbreaking issues
in Canada with regard to justiciability, jurisdiction, and state immunity.
III. COMMON LAW JURISDICTION
As mentioned above, since 2001, a total of five new transnational human
rights claims have been decided in Canada and the UK.'37 While four of the
five cases ultimately turned on immunity issues, the prior question of
jurisdiction simpliciter has proven problematic. At common law, jurisdiction
over foreign parties and events exists if plaintiffs can show a "real and substantial
connection" between the parties, the claim, and the forum.'38 The rationale of
the real and substantial connection test is to prevent courts from entertaining
claims that do not materially involve the interests of the forum and, out of
comity, to refrain from interfering in matters that arise within the jurisdiction
of another state. In applying the test, courts look at a series of connecting
factors, which are essentially territorial in nature, including the domicile of
the parties, the location of the evidence and witnesses, and the place the
injury occurred. Clearly, as the Human Rights Committee of the International
133. Bil'in (Village Council) etaL v. Green Park International Inc. et al., Motion Introducing a Suit,
Court No. 500-17-044030-081, filed 7 July 2008, at para. 9 (pleadings on file with author).
134. R.S.C. 1985 c. G-3; ibid. at paras. 16, 24.
135. S.C. 2000 c. 24; ibid. at paras. 18-20, 24.
136. Ibid., para. 39.
137. Supra note 29.
138. Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex (1986), [19871 1 A.C. 460 (H.L.); Morguard Investments
Ltd. v. DeSavoye, [199013 S.C.R. 1077; and Huntv. T&*Nplc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289. See
also Tolofion v. Jensen, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022, which represents a choice of law analogue to
these jurisdictional cases.
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Law Association British Branch observed, when applying these factors to civil
claims for extraterritorial torture, "the forum with which the action has its
closest and most real connection is the forum in which the acts complained
of ... took place. The relevant witnesses will (usually) be there; the relevant
documents (if any) will be there; and the governing law will almost certainly
(applying English [and Canadian] choice of law rules) be the law of the
foreign forum."1"9
In Bouzari v. Iran, Justice Swinton applied that test, albeit rather cursorily,
and stated that "[i]f one were to apply Canadian conflicts rules with respect to
jurisdiction in the normal fashion, the logical conclusion would be that there
is no real and substantial connection between the wrongdoing that gave rise to
the litigation and Ontario, and, therefore, Ontario courts have no jurisdiction.""'
However, Justice Swinton pointed to two factors that made her doubt the
fairness of declining jurisdiction on the basis of traditional standards, namely,
that Bouzari was suing for the jus cogens crime of torture and that he could
not reasonably expect to obtain a remedy in Iran. "Given this reality," she
concluded, "I do not feel it appropriate to decide this case on conflicts rules
alone. It may be that the Canadian courts will modify the rules on jurisdiction
... where an action for damages for torture is brought with respect to events
outside the forum." 1
As it happened, four weeks after this Bouzari decision, the Ontario Court
of Appeal released a series of five judgments, the so-called Muscutt Quintet,
clarifying the general principles and factors that govern the assumption of
jurisdiction in inter-provincial and transnational tort claims.1"2 However, the cases
did not deal with extraterritorial torture or comparable serious personal harms
and therefore did not address the aptness of territoriality-based principles of
jurisdiction in a context directly relevant to transnational human rights claims. In
the leading decision, Muscutt v. Courcelles, Justice Sharpe identified eight "factors
emerging from the case law that are relevant in assessing whether a court should
139. ILA Report, supra note 2 at 146.
140. Bouzari, supra note 29 at para. 16:
141. Ibid. at para. 17.
142. Muscutt v. Courcelles (2002), 60 O.R. (3d) 20 (C.A.) [Muscut]; Lemmex v. Sunflight Holidays
(2002), 60 O.R. (3d) 54 (C.A.); Leufkens v. Alba Tours International (2002), 60 O.R. (3d)
84 (C.A.); Gajraj v. DeBernardo (2002), 60 O.R. (3d) 68 (C.A.); and Sinclair v. Cracker
Barrel Old Country Store (2002), 60 OR. (3d) 76 (C.A.).
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assume jurisdiction against an out-of-province defendant on the basis of damage
sustained in Ontario as a result of a tort committed elsewhere.""1 3 They are:
" the connection between the forum and the plaintiffs claim;
" the connection between the forum and the defendant;
" unfairness to the defendant in assuming jurisdiction;
" unfairness to the plaintiff in not assuming jurisdiction;
• the involvement of other parties to the suit;
• the court's willingness to recognize and enforce an extra-provincial judgment
rendered on the same jurisdictional basis;
" whether the case is provincial or international in nature; and
" comity and the standards of jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement prevailing
elsewhere.
14 4
Sharpe J.A. emphasized that no one factor is determinative, but found
rather that "all relevant factors should be considered and weighed together" in
determining whether a real and substantial connection between the parties, the
proceedings, and the forum exists.
14
1
The Muscutt factors were subsequently applied in two claims arising from
extraterritorial torture: Saleh v. United Arab Emirates (Saleh) and the appellate
decision in Bouzari.1 6 In Saleh, where a Canadian citizen sued the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) in relation to his alleged detention and torture in that country,
Justice Chadwick applied the Muscutt factors and found no real and substantial
connection between the proceedings and Ontario. While he recognized the
unfairness to the defendant in not assuming jurisdiction given the latter's inability
to sue (or even return) to the UAE, the extraterritorial nature of the claim and a
thin evidentiary record ultimately militated against the assertion of jurisdiction.
In the court's view, "the injuries suffered by the plaintiff occurred in [the UAE]
and the majority of the damage suffered by the plaintiff occurred in the same
location. The evidence with reference to his pain and suffering and loss of
income in Canada is extremely sparse. As such, this Court should not exercise
jurisdiction.""'7 Because the reasons for judgment in Saleh are so brief, they
provide very little discussion of the claim itself. The court made no mention of
143. Muscutt, ibid. at 45-52.
144. Ibid.
145. Ibid. at 45.
146. Saleb, supra note 29; Bouzari (2004), supra note 29.
147. Saleb, ibid. at para. 24.
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peremptory norms, human rights, or international obligations. Instead, it applied
the eight Muscutt factors rather mechanically and concluded that it had no
jurisdiction on the basis of the insufficiency of the evidentiary record and the
tenuous territorial connections between the events and Ontario.
Though more thoughtful, the Court of Appeal's decision in Bouzari also
failed to reconcile the real and substantial connection test with the particular
nature of civil proceedings for extraterritorial torture. Goudge J.A. struggled
with the test's unwieldiness in transnational human rights cases, recognizing
that the straight application of the Muscutt factors "would probably yield the
conclusion that there is no real and substantial connection to Ontario."
14 8
Indeed, Bouzari's claim involved foreign parties and extraterritorial events with
no territorial link to Ontario other than his own presence in the forum and his
ongoing physical and psychological suffering. Though it was not necessary to
apply the test, 1 9 Goudge J.A. echoed Justice Swinton's concerns:
[There] are several circumstances that make the presumptive conclusion of no
jurisdiction troubling. First, the action is based on torture by a foreign state, which is
a violation of both international human rights and peremptory norms of public
international law. As the perpetrator, Iran has eliminated itself as a possible forum,
although it otherwise would be the most logical jurisdiction. This would seem to
diminish significantly the importance of any unfairness to the defendant due to its
lack of connection to Ontario.
Second, if Ontario does not take jurisdiction, the appellant will be left without a
place to sue. Given that the appellant is now connected to Ontario by his citizenship,
the requirement of fairness that underpins the real and substantial connection test
would seem to be of elevated importance if the alternative is that the appellant
cannot bring this action anywhere.T
Clearly, traditional rules of jurisdiction cannot easily accommodate transnational
human rights claims where private parties seek redress for extraterritorial
violations of public international norms. New categories need to be fashioned
to address the particularities of these claims, namely, the nearly inevitable lack
148. Bouzari (2004), supra note 29 at para. 32.
149. Ibid. at para. 38 (Justice Goudge stated: "However, given the conclusion I have reached on
the issue of state immunity, it is unnecessary to finally determine how the real and
substantial connection test would apply here. That is best left for a case in which the issue
must be resolved").
150. Ibid. at paras. 36-37.
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of territorial connection with the forum, the international public interest in
enforcing peremptory norms, and the imperative of avoiding denials of justice."'
One possibility is the recognition of universal civil jurisdiction for violations
of human rights that have achieved the status of peremptory norms."52 In 2004,
such a model of universal jurisdiction received an important endorsement by the
European Commission in the context of the Sosa appeal. The Commission, which
at the time represented fifteen states, filed a brief and argued generally in support
of ATS-style universal civil jurisdiction over a limited set of offences, as long as
it is exercised consistently with international law and the ends of justice. The
Commission argued that, "to the extent recognized, [universal civil jurisdiction]
should apply only to a narrow category of conduct and should be exercised only
when the claimant would otherwise be subject to a denial of justice."153
European support for a cautious, justice-oriented principle of universal civil
jurisdiction is not surprising given Europe's leading role in the ongoing work of
the Hague Conference on Private International Law, where universal civil
jurisdiction remains firmly on the agenda. In its 2001 Preliminary Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, the Conference explicitly recognized the right of states to assert
universal civil jurisdiction over certain violations of international law in draft
article 18(3):
151. On the interaction of existing categories and the forging of hybrid categories sensitive to the
transnational human rights context, see the discussion of limitation periods in the final
section of Scott, Introduction, supra note 21. See also the discussion of multiple
characterizations in the final section of Scott, Translating Torture, supra note 101.
152. See Anne C. McConville, "Taking Jurisdiction in Transnational Human Rights Tort
Litigation: Universality Jurisdiction's Relationship to ExJuris Service, Forum Non Conveniens
and the Presumption of Territoriality" in Torture as Tort, supra note 2, 157.
153. Sosa, supra note 32 [Brief of Amicus Curize the European Commission in Support of
Neither Party, 2004 WL 177036 at 26-27]. See the discussion of the reasoning in the
Commission amicus brief in Scott, "Remarks," supra note 31. See also the section "Effective
access to justice as an emerging human rights premise" in Craig Scott, "Multinational
Enterprises and Emergent Jurisprudence on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights" in Asbjorn Eide, Catarina Krause & Allan Rosas, eds., Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: A Textbook, 2d ed. (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) 563 at 592-94,
especially the interpretation of House of Lords jurisprudence as implicitly treating foreign
courts and English courts as "a fused judicial system (fused by the transnational litigation
context)" for purposes of ensuring effective access to judicial remedies in at least one of the
national court systems.
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18(3) Nothing in this Article shall prevent a court in a Contracting State from
exercising jurisdiction under national law in an action claiming damages in respect of
conduct which constitutes-
[a) genocide, a crime against humanity or a war crime;] [or]
[b) a serious crime under international law, provided that this State has established
its criminal jurisdiction over that crime in accordance with an international treaty to
which it is a party and that claim is for civil compensatory damages for death or
serious bodily injury arising from that crime.
Sub-paragraph b) only applies if the party seeking relief is exposed to a risk of a
denial of justice because proceedings in another State are not possible or cannot
reasonably be required.] 1s
It is noted that the jurisdiction provided under sub-paragraph (b) is in line
with the European Commission's submissions in Sosa, that universal jurisdiction
should be exercised in respect of violations of peremptory norms of international
law where, in the circumstances, the claimant faces the prospect of being denied
justice. It would appear that no such requirement is proposed with regard to
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The draft provision is
evidence of the growing acceptance within the international community of
some version of universal civil jurisdiction.'
Further support for universal civil jurisdiction can perhaps also be inferred
from provisions in certain countries for obtaining monetary damages in
criminal proceedings. Indeed, in many civil law legal systems, victims are
allowed to join criminal prosecutions as civil parties and seek damages as part
of the court's sentencing process."5 6 In his concurrent opinion in Sosa, Justice
Breyer explained the significance of consensus on universal jurisdiction as an
154. See Permanent Bureau & Co-reporters, "Summary of the Outcome of the Discussion in
Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference 6-20 June 2001" (Interim*
Text prepared by the Permanent Bureau and the Co-reporters from the Hague Conference
on Private International Law, The Hague, 22 June 2001), online: <http://www.hcch.net/
upload/wop/jdgm2001 draft-e.pdf>.
155. Note a certain parallelism between the permissive framing of draft article 18(3)-"n]othing
... shall prevent..."-and a savings-clause in the Convention against Torture, supra note 74,
Art. 14(2). See the discussion of the zone of judicial initiative that Art. 14(2) may open up in
Scott, "Remarks," supra note 31.
156. Beth Van Schaack, "In Defence of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of Human
Rights Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention" (2001) 42
Harv. Int'l L. J. 141 at 143.
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appropriate avenue for the prosecution of universally condemned behaviour,
including torture:
The fact this procedural consensus exists suggests that recognition of universal
jurisdiction in respect of a limited set of norms is consistent with principles of
international comity ... That consensus concerns criminal jurisdiction, but
consensus as to universal criminal jurisdiction itself suggests that universal tort
jurisdiction would be no more threatening. That is because the criminal courts of
many nations combine civil and criminal proceedings, allowing those injured by
criminal conduct to be represented and to recover damages in the criminal
proceedings itself. Thus, universal criminal jurisdiction necessarily contemplates a
significant degree of civil tort recovery as well.
15 7
In the absence of legislation equivalent to the ATS, common law courts are
left with outmoded territorially-based jurisdictional standards. While there are
signs of growing consensus about the desirability of some universal civil principle,
common law courts have yet to assert jurisdiction on this basis.
Another way of approaching the question of common law jurisdiction over
transnational human rights proceedings is to ask whether plaintiffs may point
to an available cause of action for extraterritorial human rights violations. Put
.differently, there is a debate as to whether violations of public international
norms protecting the human person entail the recognition of a private right to
seek redress at common law. This issue is relevant to the general topic of
Torture as Tort, as transnational human rights litigation is largely conditioned
by the manner and extent to which international law is understood to interact
with domestic law. Indeed, if plaintiffs and lawyers bring civil claims with
respect to breaches of international law in domestic courts, it is because they
assume that domestic courts can properly administer that law and grant
appropriate remedies for its violations.
In common law jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, the United
States, and Canada, it is a well-established principle that customary international
norms are incorporated into the common law and that national courts may
ascertain, interpret, and apply those norms in appropriate cases.'5 8 Since the
157. Sosa, supra note 32 at 762-63.
158. Hape, supra note 31 at para. 39; Ian Brownlie, Principles ofPublic International Law, 6th ed.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) at 41-44; Hersch Lauterpacht, "Is International
Law Part of the Law of England?" in Elihu Lauterpacht, ed., International Law: Being The
Collected Papers ofHersch Lauterpacht, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
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eighteenth century, common law courts have generally adhered to Blackstone's
view that "the law of nations (wherever any question arises which is properly
the object of it's [sic] jurisdiction) is here adopted in it's [sic] full extent by the
common law, and is held to be part of the law of the land." '159
But what effect do customary international norms have once they are
incorporated into the law of the land? Are they automatically binding, in the
sense that they can form the rule of decision of the court? Do incorporated
customary international norms give rise to enforceable rights at common law?
Some customary norms are given automatic effect at domestic law; for instance,
before the enactment of state immunity legislation, national courts ascertained
and directly applied the customary rules of state immunity as a matter of
course.16 But in other contexts, such as criminal law, the direct applicability of
customary norms remained largely undetermined. Clarification on this front
came in 2006, when the House of Lords rendered its decision in R. v. Jones.161
In that case, a group of peace activists sought a declaration that the British
government had committed the international crime of aggression when it took
part in the invasion of Iraq. The customary crime of aggression, it was argued,
was enforceable in domestic courts by virtue of its incorporation into the
common law. The Law Lords upheld the general principle of incorporation,
but held that if common law judges once enjoyed the power to create new
offences, it was no longer appropriate to do so. Ultimately, the court held that
customary international crimes were not directly triable in domestic courts
pursuant to the policy that the power to define criminal offences rests solely
with Parliament.162 The Federal Court of Australia had reached a similar
conclusion in Tompson v. Nulyarimma,163 where individuals sought to enforce
the international prohibition against genocide in domestic courts in relation to
the government's treatment of the Aboriginal population. This debate, of
1975) 537; and Gibran van Ert, Using International Law in Canadian Courts (The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 2002) at 137-70. See also Franqois Larocque & Martin Kreuzer,
"L'incorporation de la coutume internationale en common law canadienne" (2007) 45 Can.
Y. Int'l L. [forthcoming in 2008].
159. Blackstone, supra note 31 at 67.
160. See e.g. Trendtex, supra note 1.
161. R. v. Jones, 20061 UKHL 16, [2007] 1 AC 136 (H.L.) [Jones].
162. Ibid. at paras. 10, 30-31, 65-66.
163. See Nulyarimma v. Thompson (1999), 120 I.L.R. 353 (Fed. Ct. Australia).
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course, could not have gone very far in Canada, where common law criminal
offences do not exist.
164
What effect does R. v. Jones have on transnational human rights litigation?
Do the policy reasons of democratic accountability and legitimacy, which counsel
against the direct enforcement of international crimes in domestic courts, apply
mutatis mutandis to the recognition of internationally derived torts through the
common law? The House of Lords said nothing of the propriety of enforcing
international norms through domestic civil actions, though Lord Hoffman was
careful to confine his conclusions to the criminal law.165 Lord Bingham perplexingly
cited Sosa as an example of an instance where an international norm was not
domestically enforced.'66 In Sosa, it will be recalled, the US Supreme Court found
that the prohibition against arbitrary detention lacked sufficient definite content
at international law to be actionable under the. ATS. It is unclear how Lord
Bingham felt that Sosa was on point: Sosa is not authority for the proposition
that international norms may not give rise to enforceable rights in domestic
courts per se, but is rather a decision about the specific requirements of the ATS,
a statute with no equivalent in the UK.
In any case, R. v. Jones appears to have reignited a debate, which had
seemingly been extinguished by Lord Denning in Trendex' . between two
competing views regarding the manner in which customary norms are received
into the common law. Under one concept-incorporation-customary norms
are adopted into the common law and directly applicable as such by domestic
courts. Blackstone and Lord Mansfield are frequently cited as authorities for
incorporation. 68 Under the other view, transformation, customary norms have no
direct effect in domestic courts without some prior overt and formal act of assent
by Parliament. The classic authority for transformation remains R. v. Keyn,'69
where the court queried whether it could exercise its criminal jurisdiction in
relation to a crime committed by a foreigner on a foreign ship situated in
164. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46, s. 9. (eliminating common law offences, but creating
an exception for contempt of court).
165. Jones, supra note 161 at para. 62.
166. Ibid. at para. 23.
167. Trendtex, supra note 1 at 554.
168. Shaheed Fatima, Using international Law in Domestic Courts (Oxford: Hart, 2005) at 405.
169. R. v. Keyn (1876), 2 Ex. D. 63.
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English territorial waters. Since English law provided no guidance on these
issues, Chief Justice Cockburn reviewed the international law on the matter, but
declined to give effect to any international rule without sufficient evidence that
the examined principles "have received the assent of the nations who are to be
bound by it. This assent may be express, as by treaty or the acknowledged
concurrence of governments, or may be implied from established usage." '
Chief Justice Cockburn then went on to clarify his view of Parliament's role:
In the absence of proof of assent, as derived from one or other of these sources, no
unanimity on the part of theoretical writers would warrant the judicial application of
the [international] law on the sole authority of their views or statements. Nor, in my
opinion, would the clearest proof of unanimous assent on the part of other nations
be sufficient to authorize the tribunals of this country to apply, without an Act of
Parliament, what would practically amount to a new law. In so doing we should be
unjustifiably usurping the province of the legislature.1
7
1
In Chief Justice Cockburn's view, then, international norms have no
domestic effect if they have not been transformed into domestic law by statute.
A century later in Trendtex Lord Denning rejected transformation, holding that
the Court of Appeal could apply the newly developed customary norm of
restrictive immunity without waiting for Parliament to intervene. "As between the
two schools," Lord Denning stated, "I now believe the doctrine of incorporation
is correct. Otherwise I do not see that our courts could ever recognize a change
in the rules of international law. ... International law does change, and the courts
have applied the changes without the aid of any Act of Parliament."7 2
Though the Court of Appeal's decision in Trendtex apparently signalled the
death of transformation, the House of Lords decision in R. v. Jones resuscitated it
for international crimes. NWhile other international norms may well be directly
incorporated into and applied at common law, customary international crimes
must receive the transformative assent of Parliament. In short, despite Lord
Millet's view to the contrary in Pinochet (No. 3),"73 it is now firmly established
that customary international crimes are not directly triable in English courts.
170. Ibid. at 202.
171. Ibid. at 203.
172. Trendtex, supra note I at 554.
173. Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte
(No. 3), [1999] 2 W.L.R 827 at 911-12 [Pinochet (No. 3)].
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It remains to be seen whether and to what extent courts outside the United
States will be receptive to the direct enforcement of international norms
through the common law. In R. v. Hape, a case on the extraterritorial application
of the Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the continued relevance
of the doctrine of incorporation in Canada and instructed courts to "look to
prohibitive rules of customary international law to aid in the interpretation of
Canadian law and the development of the common law.""'7 It may be that, on the
basis of their inherent jurisdiction, Canadian and English courts are able to
recognize new causes of action for torture on the theory that the "prohibitive
rules of customary law" are incorporated into the common law. But looking
back at the few Canadian and English transnational human rights proceedings
on record, it is striking to note how little judicial discussion this issue has
received. One wonders whether the Bouzari and A1-Adsani courts simply assumed
it to be within their purview to enforce international norms through their civil
jurisdiction. Reference to the principle of incorporation in the courts' reasons for
judgment supports this hypothesis, though it is impossible to draw definitive
conclusions in the absence of explicit reasoning on this point. One possible
explanation, of course, is that the courts did not feel compelled to say much on
the civil actionability of the international crime of torture in light of their
decisions that the claims were barred in any event by state immunity.
IV. STATE IMMUNITY
Just as it challenges jurisdiction simpliciter, transnational human rights litigation
also challenges established conceptions of state immunity." 5 The recognized
exceptions to state immunity do not provide ready-made solutions for claims
alleging gross breaches of peremptory norms of international law, such as torture,
genocide, slavery, and extrajudicial killing.176 Indeed, the commercial activity
174. Hape, supra note 31 at para. 39 [emphasis added].
175. See Wai, supra note 101; Adams, supra note 19. See also Franqois Larocque, "Bouzari v. Iran:
Testing the Limits of State Immunity in Canadian Courts" (2003) 41 Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 343
[Larocque, Bouzari]; Andrea Bianchi, "Denying State Immunity to Violators of Human
Rights" (1994) 46 Austrian J. Pub. Int'l L. 195.
176. Ian Brownlie, "Principles of Public International Law" in Roswell B. Perkins et al., eds.,
Restatement of the Law: The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, vol.1 (St. Paul:
American Law Institute Publishers, 1987) at 537.
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exception arose in response to increased international trade and the need to ensure
fairness and stability in commercial transactions. 77 The local tort exception, for
its part, was designed to enforce the sovereign interest of the forum state in
proceedings concerning death or personal injury occurring on its territory.
178
But lawsuits for extraterritorial human rights violations differ substantially from
commercial litigation or claims arising from receiving-state motor vehicle
accidents involving diplomatic personnel, the typical scenario envisaged by the
local tort exception. While one type of claim concerns the interests of private
parties, the other involves the vital interests of the entire community of nations.
1 7 9
As defined by article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
peremptory norms of international law are rules from which no derogation is
allowed.18 In the vertical international legal order, peremptory norms embody
the highest and most fundamental values. They represent categorical limits on
state prerogative, effectively invalidating contrary acts, and, as such, operate
substantially like a constitution.181 While the prohibitions on slavery, torture,
extrajudicial killing, war crimes, and genocide are generally regarded as peremptory
norms, the rule of state immunity is not. Accordingly, complex questions arise
when peremptory norms and state immunity collide. What are the international
legal ramifications of granting immunity to a state that allegedly practices torture?
Does a forum state engage its own international responsibility by granting
immunity to an alleged torturer state? Is the grant of immunity tantamount to
some form of complicity in or recognition of the breach?
182
177. Peter D. Troobof, "Foreign State Immunity: Emerging Consensus on Principles" (1986) 200
R.C. 245 at 266-67.
178. Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 309.
179. Alexander Orakhelashvili, "State Immunity and International Public Order" (2002) 45 Get.
Yearbook Int'l L. 227.
180. Vienna Convention, supra note 35. See also Adams, supra note 19 at 272.
181. Furundzia, supra note 118 at para 155; Orakhelashvili, supra note 179.
182. Jordan J. Paust, "Federal Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and
Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the FSIA and the Act of
State Doctrine" (1983) 23 Va. J. Int'l L. 191. See also the International Law Commission's
Articles on State Responsibility, which provide that "[n]o State shall recognize as lawful a
situation created by a serious breach [of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of
general international law]." James Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on
State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002), Art. 41(2).
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Equally unsettling are the questions that arise when one attempts to apply
classic immunity analysis to transnational human rights claims. What weight, if
any, should the jus cogens status of the torture or genocide prohibitions have
when defining those acts for immunity purposes? Can torture or genocide ever
be characterized as being acts jure imperii? As Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and
Buergenthal pointed out in their Joint Separate Opinion in the Arrest Warrant
case of 2002:
It is now increasingly claimed in the literature ... that serious international crimes
cannot be regarded as official acts because they are neither normal State functions
nor functions that a State alone (in contrast to an individual) can perform ... This
.view is underscored by the increasing realization that State-related motives are not
the proper test for determining what constitutes public State acts.
183
The view that state immunity at international law must be countenanced in a
manner consistent with the peremptoriness of the torture prohibition has not
yet become part of the mainstream, though there are signs of impending change.
Lingering resistance can largely be attributed to strict constructions of national
immunity statutes in common law jurisdictions where judges, rightly or wrongly,
refrain from exercising their historical purview in this field.18
This can be seen in the European Court of Human Rights decision in
Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom.18 After exhausting his legal options in the United
Kingdom,186 AI-Adsani took his claim to Strasbourg and alleged that by upholding
Kuwait's immunity, the British State Immunity Act 1978 prevented his access to
justice, a right guaranteed under the European Human Rights Convention.'87
The seventeen-judge Grand Chamber divided nine-to-eight on that issue.
While the majority recognized that thejus cogens nature of the torture prohibition
entailed the removal of immunity of individuals in criminal trials, it observed
that no similar rule of international law had emerged for states in the context of
civil proceedings.' 88 The eight-judge minority strongly disagreed with this
183. Arrest Warrant of 11 April2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), [2002] I.C.J.
Rep. 1 at 85. Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Buergenthal, and Kooijmans
[internal references omitted].
184. Larocque, Bouzari, supra note 175 at 374-84.
185. [2001] 34 E.H.R.R. 273 [A1-Adsani (2001)].
186. Ibid.
187. 16 May 1972, Eur. T.S. 74, Art. 6.
188. Al-Adsani (2001), supra note 185 at 66.
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distinction between criminal and civil proceedings:
It is not the nature of the proceedings which determines the effects that ajus cogens
rule has upon another rule of international law, but the character of the rule as a
peremptory norm and its interaction with a hierarchically lower rule. The prohibition
of torture, being a rule ofjus cogens, acts in the international sphere and deprives the
rule of sovereign immunity of all its legal effects in that sphere.
189
Given the stark disagreement in Strasbourg, it is likely that the normative
hierarchy debate will resurface.
However that may be, the European Court's decision in AI-Adsani was
followed by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Bouzari, where an
Iranian national sued his government for torture in Tehran. Much like in
Al-Adsani (2001), both the motions judge and the Court of Appeal for Ontario
held the claims in Bouzari to be barred by the Canadian State Immunity Act
(SIA),19° which contains no exceptions for human rights violations. Nor could
one be created as a matter of common law, since, according to the Court of
Appeal, the Canadian statute must be taken as a complete code. 91 The courts
further adopted the European Court's view in AI-Adsani (2001) that neither
customary international law nor treaty law required the denial of immunity
in civil claims for extraterritorial torture. Of particular interest was the courts'
reading of Article 14 of the Convention Against Torture, which provides that
"each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of
torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate
compensation." '192 Based on the evidence before them, the motions judge
and the Court of Appeal accepted the orthodox reading of Article 14 that
requires states to compensate individuals only if they were tortured in their
own territory.1
93
189. Ibid. (joint dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis and Calflisch, joined by Judges Wildhaber,
Costa, Cabral Barreto, and Vaji6, at §4). Judges Ferrari, Bravo, and Loucaides each issued
separate dissenting reasons along similar lines.
190. R.S.C. 1985, c. S-18 [SIA].
191. Bouzari (2004), supra note 29 at para. 57.
192. Convention Against Torture, supra note 74 at Art. 14.
193. Bouzari, supra note 29 at para. 54; Bouzari (2004), supra note 29 at 692-93. See Andrew
Byrnes, "Civil Remedies for Torture Committed Abroad: An Obligation under the
Convention Against Torture?" in Torture as Tort, supra note 2, 537; Peter Burns and Sean
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The correctness of this interpretation of Article 14 has recently been cast
into doubt. In May 2005, upon hearing Canada's report that the Bouzari case
had been dismissed, the Committee Against Torture-the body that monitors
state compliance with the Convention Against Torture-expressed concerns
about the absence in Canada "of effective measures to provide civil compensation
to victims of torture in all cases,"19 that is, including cases against states and not
just individual defendants. The Committee then recommended that Canada
"review its position under Article 14 of the Convention to ensure provision
of compensation through its civil jurisdiction to all victims of torture."' The
use of the words "all victims of torture" in the Committee's report is noteworthy
and appears to imply that both .Canadian and foreign victims of torture are
contemplated. Accordingly, and perhaps most importantly, the ultimate
implication of the Committee's recommendation appears to be that Article
14 is intended to target both domestic and extraterritorial torture. While the
Committee Against Torture's interpretation of the Convention Against Torture is
not binding, it is highly persuasive authority that could properly be invoked by a
court of law. It remains to be seen whether future courts will feel empowered by
the Committee's recommendations or whether they will wait for Parliament to
amend the SI 96
On the basis of the rulings in Bouzari, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
also dismissed claims against Syria and Jordan for torture. In Arar v. Syrian
Arab Republic,"'7 Justice Echlin held that the SIA contained no exception for
extraterritorial torture, and that none could be read in on a Charter remedy
basis. On another front, the court took the view that, on the face of the pleadings,
McBurney, "Impunity and the United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Shadow Play
Without an Ending?" in Torture as Tort, supra note 2, 275.
194. OHCHR, 33rd Sess., 658th Mtg., UN Doc. CAT/C/SR.658 (2005) at para. 4 (g) [emphasis
added].
195. Ibid., at para. 5(f) [emphasis added].
196. At the time of writing, Canadian and British parliaments are studying private members' bills
that would create causes of action for terrorism and torture, respectively, and
correspondingly amend the SIA in both countries to deny immunity in such proceedings. In
Canada, see Bill S-225, An Act to amend the State Immunity Act and the Criminal Code
(deterring terrorism by providing a civil right of action against perpetrators and sponsors of
terrorism), 2nd Sess., 39th Parl., 2008. In the United Kingdom, see Bill 49, Torture
(Damages) Bill [HL], 2007-2008 Sess., 2008 (2nd reading 16 May 2008).
197. Arar, supra note 29.
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the case disclosed insufficient allegations of Canada's complicity in the torture
to engage Arar's Charter rights.19
In addition to Bouzari, Arar, and Saleh, two other Canadians have recently
been tortured abroad. In 2003, Zahra Kazemi, a Montreal-based photojournalist,
was arrested in Tehran while taking pictures of a student protest. She was brutally
tortured and died in Iranian custody after her arrest. Diplomatic attempts by the
Canadian government and Kazemi's relatives to repatriate her body or obtain a
semblance of justice have thus far been unsuccessful. 99 In 2006, the estate of Zahra
Kazemi brought proceedings in the Superior Court of Quebec requesting $17
million in damages against, the Islamic Republic of Iran and an order for the
repatriation of Kazemi's remains. In addition to the Republic of Iran, the Kazemi
action names the head of state, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Chief Public Prosecutor
of Tehran, and the former Deputy Chief of Intelligence as co-defendants."' State
immunity will predictably be the most contentious aspect of this litigation.
The other case is that of William Sampson, a Vancouver man who, along
with five other British men, was arrested in Saudi Arabia in 2000 and accused
of bombings in that country. He was jailed for nearly three years during which
time he was regularly tortured.2"' While Sampson has not sought redress in
Canadian courts, he and two of his British co-detainees (Mitchell and Walker)
sought to initiate proceedings against Saudi officials in the UK with respect to
the torture they suffered. Their attempts to sue were stopped short, as they were
denied leave to effectuate service exjuris on grounds of state immunity." 2
During the same period, another British citizen, Ronald Jones, was
detained and tortured by Saudi officials in circumstances unconnected with
Sampson, Mitchell, and Walker. Upon his return to England, he commenced
proceedings for torture against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In 2003, Master
Whitaker of the Queen's Court set aside service of Jones's claim against Saudi
Arabia on the basis that the kingdom was immune under the State Immunity
198. Ibid. at paras. 16-18.
199. For details of the Kazemi affair, see "CBC News In Depth: Zahra Kazemi" CBC News (27
November 2007), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/kazemi/> (pleadings).
200. Estate of the Late Zahara Kazemi et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al, Motion to Institute
Proceedings, Court No. 500-17-031760-062, online: <http://www.zibakazemi.org/suitqc.pdf>.
201. For more details of the Sampson affair, see "In-depth: The William Sampson Story" CBC
News (14 June 2006), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/sampson/>.
202. Mitchell, supra note 29.
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Act 1978.203 The appeal from that decision was heard in conjunction with the
Sampson, Mitchell, and Walker appeal in 2004. The Court-of Appeal dismissed
the Jones claim against Saudi Arabia, but allowed the appeal of the other
claimants. With regard to Saudi Arabia, the Court of Appeal in essence followed
its own ruling in Al-Adsani (1996)"' and that of the majority of the European
Court of Human Rights in Al-Adsani (2001),"' holding that international law
did not yet recognize an exception to state immunity for torture and that, in
any. event, the State Immunity Act 1978 did not apply.
While the Court of Appeal felt bound by its previous ruling in Al-Adsani
(1996), where it held that the jus cogens status of torture did not diminish the
immunity of foreign states, it did not show the same attachment to its 1997
decision in Propend,"6 where it held that state officials benefit from the same
immunity as the state itself for acts performed in the normal course of duty.
Following the House of Lords' lead in Pinochet (No. 3), the court recognized that
torture was prohibited by a peremptory norm of international law and did not
"fall within the scope of the official duties of a state official.""' Lord Denning,
recanting the position he had taken in Pinochet (No. 3), stated: "[o]nce the
conclusion is reached that torture cannot be treated as the exercise of a state
function so as to attract immunity ratione materiae in criminal proceedings
against individuals, it seems to me that it cannot logically be so treated in civil
proceedings against individuals.""2 8 In short, the court ruled that, given the
special status of the torture prohibition and the limited subject-matter
immunity of state officials at international law, it could "no longer be
appropriate to give blanket effect to a foreign state's claim to state immunity
ratione materiae in respect of a state official alleged to have committed acts of
203. Jones, supra note 29.
204. Al-Adsani (1996), supra note 19.
205. Al-Adsani (2001), supra note 185.
206. PropendFinance'v. Sing (1997), 111 I.L.R. 611 (C.A.).
207. Jones, supra note 29 at para. 125.
208. Ibid. at para. 127. Compare with his dictum in Pinochet (No. 3), supra note 173 at 281,
which reads: "[w]ere these civil proceedings in which damages were claimed in respect of acts
committed by Senator Pinochet in the government of Chile, Chile could argue that it was
itself indirectly impleaded. That argument does not run where the proceedings are criminal
and where the issue is Senator Pinochet's personal responsibility, not that of Chile."
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systematic torture."" 9 The court remanded the plaintiffs' application for leave
to serve outside the jurisdiction to the Queen's Court for further consideration.
Before discussing the House of Lords decision in the Jones and Mitchell cases,
21 0
other developments in the law of state immunity will be canvassed.
A notable development was the removal of Iraq and Libya from the US list of
designated "state sponsors of terrorism" in 2004 and 2006, respectively.
21'
Accordingly, Iraq and Libya are no longer in the same league as Cuba, Iran, North
Korea, Syria, and Sudan, the remaining designated "state sponsors of terrorism"
that have no immunity in US courts when sued by US citizens for acts of torture,
extrajudicial killing, and terrorism pursuant to 51607(a)(7) of the FSIA.212
Other important immunity-related developments occurred outside the
common law world. In 2000, the Hellenic Supreme Court (Areios Pagos) heard
a civil action arising from the Nazi occupation of Greece during the Second
World War.213 The court held that Germany's violations of peremptory norms
amounted to an implied waiver of its immunity, an argument that had not been
well received in US cases because the waiver exception to immunity ultimately
hinges upon acceptance by the foreign state that it is amenable to the lawsuit.1
The lower court decision was reversed in 2002 by a six-to-five majority of the
Greek Special Supreme Court (Anotato Eidiko Dikasterio), holding that the
military activities of foreign states are protected by state immunity, "regardless
of whether the acts constitute a violation of jus cogens or not."2 5 Moreover, in
Ferrini v. Germany, an Italian civil claim in relation to forced deportation and
slave labour during the Second World War, the Italian Corte di Cassazione
209. Jones, ibid. at para. 126.
210. See notes 199-220 and accompanying text.
211. Iraq was removed from the list in 2004 by Presidential Determination (69 Fed. Reg. 18810
(2004) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. part 126)), and its designation was officially rescinded
later that year (69 Fed. Reg. 61702 (2004)). Moreover, by Presidential Determination dated
12 May 2006, George W. Bush certified the rescission of Libya's designation as a State
sponsor of terrorism (see 71 Fed. Reg. 31907 (2006)), in keeping with his administration's
policy to restore diplomatic relations with that country.
212. Swan, supra note 4 at 71, note 23.
213. Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, 4 May 2000, case 11/2000, Areios Pagos
(Hellenic Supreme Court), summarized at (2001) 95 A.J.I.L. 198.
214. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
215. Andrea Gattini, "To What Extent Are State Immunity and Non-Justiciability Major Hurdles
to Individuals' Claims for War Damages?" (2003) 1 J.I.C.J. 348 at 361. As the author points
out, however, the comments of the Special Court on this issue are obiter dicta. See ibid.
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ruled that Germany was not entitled to claim immunity for violations of
peremptory norms on the basis of the same normative hierarchy argument that
failed in AI-Adansi, Bouzari, and Jones.21 6
Also in 2004, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the United
Nations Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property
(UN Convention) and opened it for signature.1 7 Aside from the European
Convention on State Immunity, it is the only multilateral treaty on state immunity.
Pursuant to Article 30, the UN Convention will come into force on the 30th
day following the deposit of the 30th instrument of ratification.218 It remains to
be seen whether it will be more successful than the European Convention, to
which only eight states have adhered since its adoption in: 1972. Neither treaty
allows exceptions for human rights violations, but Norway claims that the UN
Convention's silence does not preclude such an exception from developing at
international law.2 11 It is unknown what impact the UN Convention will have
on international thinking, particularly with respect to whether international law
permits or requires states to assume jurisdiction over foreign states in circumstances
implicating serious human rights violations. As will be seen below, the House
of Lords used the UN Convention's silence on human rights to uphold the
immunity of Saudi Arabia in a civil proceeding for torture.22
Finally, in Jones, 21 the House of Lords reversed the Court of Appeal
decision2 2 that dismissed the claim against Saudi Arabia as barred by the State
Immunity Act 1978, but upheld the claim against the named officials. In his
216. Andrea Gattini, "War Crimes and State Immunity in the Ferrini Decision" (2005) 3 J.I.C.J. 224.
217. GA Res. 59/38, UN GAOR, 59th Sess., Supp. No. 49, UN Doc. A159149, Vol. 1 (2005) 486.
218. At the time of writing, of the twenty-eight states that have- signed the convention, only four
have completed the ratification process: Austria, Norway, Portugal, and Romania. The
United Nations Treaty Collection, online: <http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/
englishinternetbible/partl/chapterlll/treaty38.asp>.
219. Upon ratifying the UN Convention in March 2006, Norway filed its understanding "that the
Convention is without prejudice to any future international development in the protection
of human rights." United Nations Covenant on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their
Property, Norway: Ratification, C.N.280.2006.TREATIES-2 (Depository Notification),
online: <http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2005/05/2005053 1%2003-50%20PM/
Related%20Documents/CN.280.2006-Eng.pdf>.
220. See notes 221-23, below, and accompanying text.
221. Jones, supra note 161.
222. (2004), [20051 Q.B. 699 (C.A.).
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leading speech, Lord Bingham criticized the Court of Appeal for distinguishing
between the immunity of the state and that of its officials, holding that a state
may claim immunity for any act of its agents, regardless of the legality of those
acts. The fact that the impugned conduct contravened a well-established
peremptory norm of international law was, in his view, of no consequence.
Lord Bingham then went on to dismantle and distinguish the authorities that
support the proposition that jus cogens violations such as torture do not attract
immunity at international law.223 The strong minority in AI-Adsani (2001), the
holding in Pinochet (No. 3), Justice Breyer's concurrence in Sosa, Judge Cassese's
dicta in Furundzija, the Corte di Cassazione's decision in Ferrini, and the
Committee against Torture's recommendations to Canada-all of which have been
discussed above-were each held to be inapplicable. Lord Hoffman agreed with
Lord Bingham and held, further, that whatever substantive effect peremptory
prohibitions may have at international law, they do not entail the assumption
of civil jurisdiction, or otherwise affect the procedural rules by which English
courts determine their jurisdiction.22 In short, the Law Lords agreed with the
Court of Appeal in Bouzari (2004) that both international and national law still
accorded states and their agents full immunity in civil lawsuits for torture.
One of the most surprising aspects of the decision in Jones is the House of
Lords' parochial treatment of some of the relevant international and foreign
authorities. This was most striking in its dismissal of the Committee Against
Torture's recommendations that Canada review its position under Article 14 to
ensure the compensation of torture victims in all cases. Lord Bingham noted
that the Committee was "not an exclusively legal and not an adjudicative body"
and that "whatever its value in influencing the trend of international thinking,
the legal authority of this recommendation is slight.""22 Lord Hoffman was
more severe in his appraisal of the Committee's work: "Quite why Canada was
singled out for this treatment is unclear, but as interpretation of article 14 or a
statement of international law, I regard it as having no value." '226 These are
startling comments from two judicial members of the British Institute of
International and Comparative Law.
223. Jones, supra note 161 at paras. 17-28 (per Lord Bingham).
224. Ibid. at paras. 44-46 (per Lord Hoffman).
225. Ibid. at para. 23 (per Lord Bingham).
226. Ibid. at para. 57 (per Lord Hoffman).
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While reports and recommendations from treaty monitoring bodies are not
usually binding, they are nevertheless persuasive authority and courts may properly
invoke them in framing treaty obligations. For instance, in Suresh, the Supreme
Court of Canada relied on a 2000 report from the Committee Against Torture
to support its reading of the Convention Against Torture in that case.227 Some
commentators argue that, through their reports and recommendations,
treaty-monitoring bodies have a measurable impact on the development of
international law as a whole. According to van Ert, the reports, statements, and
recommendations of treaty-monitoring bodies serve not only "to ensure compliance
with their respective instruments," but also "to elucidate and develop the content
of the international obligations they enforce." '228 "In this sense," he adds, "the
treaty-monitoring bodies may not only apply international law but also develop
it." 9 Of course, the power to recommend and the ultimate weight of the
recommendations depend very much on the mandate of the monitoring body as
defined in the treaty itself. By the terms of the Convention Against Torture, state
parties are obligated to report to the Committee Against Torture, which is
composed of "experts of ... recognized competence in the field of human rights."2 '
The Convention Against Torture empowers the Committee to make "such
comments or suggestions on the report as it considers appropriate. ""' To state,
as Lord Hoffman did, that the Committee's recommendations have "no value"
is more than a little cynical. His Lordship's characterization undermines the
institutional framework established by the Convention Against Torture, to which
Canada and the UK have subscribed.
The House of Lords' treatment of the Ferrini decision also deserves comment.
In Jones, both Lord Bingham and Lord Hoffman took the view that the case was
wrongly decided and that, in any event, "one swallow does not make a rule of
international law." '232 Lord Hoffman had been impressed by a thoughtful
commentary of the decision premised on Dworkin's model of the judicial task.233
227. Suresh, supra note 36 at para. 73.
228. van Ert, supra note 158 at 45.
229. Ibid.
230. Convention Against Torture, supra note 74, Art. 17.
231. Ibid., Art. 19.
232. Jones, supra note 161 at para. 22 (per Lord Bingham).
233. See Pasquale De Sena & Francesca De Vittor, "State Immunity and Human Rights: The
Italian Supreme Court Decision on the Ferrini Case" (2005) 16 E.J.I.L. 89.
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As summarized by Lord Hoffman, the authors of the case note argued "that the
Ferrini case should be seen ... as giving priority to the values embodied in the
prohibition of torture over the values and policies of the rules of state immunity. ""'
While His Lordship agreed that this manner of ordering competing principles
is a basic technique of adjudication in domestic law, he denied that it could be
also applied in cases involving international law. He stated that "[ilt is not for a
national court to 'develop' international law by unilaterally adopting a version
of that law which, however desirable, forward-looking and reflective of values it
may be, is simply not accepted by other states."23
With respect, Lord Hoffman misapprehends the historical role international
law has accorded national courts in contributing to its development. National
courts are powerful participants in the international legal order, shaping and
directing the future path of the law alongside the governments and legislatures
of the states they serve. For his part, Westlake understood the international
function of national courts to flow from the unity of customary law and the
common law. The international law that is received into the common law, he
wrote, is that "which at the time exists between States, without prejudice to the
right and duty of the courts to assist in developing its acknowledged principles
in the same manner in which they assist in developing the principles of the
common law." '236 In contemporary international legal terms, the creative function
of national courts can be seen in the bottom-up incorporation of the so-called
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations."23 According to Franck,
national courts are "the principal progenitors of third-party international law;"
they are "profoundly and quite properly involved in the process of international
law-making, for international law is part of the law of all civilized states, just as,
reciprocally, the 'general principles of law recognized by civilized States' has been
incorporated, by Article 38 of the Statute of the World Court, in the international
corpusjuris."23 To be sure, as Lord Bingham himself acknowledges, Lord Denning's
234. Jones, supra note 161 at para. 63 (per Lord Hoffman).
235. Ibid.
236. John Westlake, "Is International Law a Part of the Law of England?" (1906) 22 Law Q. Rev.
14 at 26.
237. Statute of the International Court ofJustice, Art. 38(1)(c).
238. Thomas M. Franck, The Structure of Impartialit. Examining the Riddle of One Law in a
Fragmented World (New York: Macmillan, 1968) at 223.
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adoption of the restrictive rule of state immunity in Trendtex 239 and the Privy
Council's earlier decision to the same effect in Philippine Admiral 211 were key
factors in helping that principle gain international acceptance in the common
law world.4 1 To say, as Lord Hoffman did, that "it is not for a national court to
'develop' international law," effectively amounts to a repudiation of the creative
function that international law extends to national courts, and which English
courts have traditionally exercised with prudent wisdom. If national courts were
instrumental in establishing the restrictive rule of immunity in the twentieth
century, it is difficult to understand why they could not participate in the further
development of that rule in the twenty-first century with regard to violations of
peremptory norms of international law protecting the human person.
Finally, the House of Lords' characterization of the UN Convention requires
brief commentary. Lord Bingham properly observed that the Convention did not
contain a human rights exception and that, in any event, the UK had not
ratified it. He went on to say that "despite its embryonic status, this
Convention is the most authoritative statement available on the current
international understanding of the limits of state immunity in civil cases, and the
absence of a torture or jus cogens exception is wholly inimical to the claimants'
contention. '22 The Convention is clearly the latest authoritative statement on the
law of state immunity, but cannot accurately be portrayed as a perfect reflection
of contemporary international thinking. It is no more than an expression of
compromise; such is the nature of the international treaty-making process. But
as Lord Bingham correctly noted, the International Law Commission working
group debated the inclusion of a human rights exception to state immunity
in 1999.21' The fact that no consensus was reached is surely significant, but
the debate inversely reveals that a growing number of judges, scholars, and
governments support the recognition of a human rights exception to state
immunity. While it may be, as the House of Lords held, that international law
does yet recognize an exception to the rule of state immunity in transnational
human rights proceedings for torture, that state of affairs is not likely to endure.
239. Trendtex, supra note 1.
240. PhillipineAdmiralv. Wallem Shipping (1975), [1977] A.C. 373 (P.C.).
241. Jones, supra note 161 at para. 8 (per Lord Bingham).
242. Ibid. at para. 26 (per Lord Bingham).
243. Ibid.
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V. COMPENSATION AND OTHER REMEDIES
As one delves deeply into the procedural details and preliminary questions that
arise in transnational human rights litigation, it is easy to lose sight of the goal
such lawsuits seek to achieve: obtaining some form of legal remedy for victims
of grave human rights violations. Transnational human rights litigation is aimed
particularly at compensation, but trials are not the only available process, nor is
financial compensation the only available type of reparation. International and
domestic law recognize other remedies that may be applicable to human rights
victims, such as restitution, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of
non-repetition. 2" All of these remedies, including financial compensation, may
be obtained through non-adversarial public processes such as diplomatic
channels or commissions of inquiry.
The case of Maher Arar is a good example. As mentioned above,245 in 2003,
Arar, a Canadian national, was detained and tortured for one year in Jordan
and Syria after being arrested and deported by US officials while in transit at
New York's JFK International Airport. In 2004, the government of Canada
ordered a judicial inquiry into the role of Canadian officials in Arar's ordeal.
Justice Dennis O'Connor of the Ontario Court of Appeal was appointed
commissioner under the Inquiries Act and granted extensive investigative powers.2"
In 2006, Justice O'Connor released his report clearing Arar of any wrongdoing
and finding no evidence that he constituted a threat to national security. While
there was no direct evidence that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or
Canadian Security Intelligence Service participated in his deportation, Justice
O'Connor found evidence suggesting that US officials acted on the basis of
information about Arar given to them by Canadian law enforcement and security
services. Justice O'Connor also found many shortcomings in Canada's
approach to securing Arar's release from Syrian custody.247 In 2007, on the basis
244. Commission on Human Rights, The right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for
victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamentalfreedoms: Final report of the Special
Rapporteur, Mr. M. Cherif Bassiouni, submitted in accordance with Commission resolution
1999/33, UN (HR, 56th Sess., Item 11 (d)), UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62 (18 January 2000).
245. Supra note 23.
246. Inquiries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-11.
247. Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, A
New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities (Ottawa: Public Works
and Government Services Canada, 2006).
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of the recommendations contained in Justice O'Connor's report, Arar obtained
a formal apology from the Canadian government and a CDN $11 million
compensatory award. This result is to be contrasted with Arar's failed litigation
in relation to the same events. His lawsuit against US state officials in the Eastern
District Court of New York 248 and his claim against Syria in the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice haVe both been dismissed.249
The combined effect of the Arar outcome, the Unocal settlement, and the
variegated results in enforcing ATS and FSIA judgments suggests that
transnational human rights litigation's greatest value does not lie in the hope of
compensatory awards at the end of costly trials, but rather in the publicity such
trials generate and their ability to bring about positive results for victims of
human rights abuse.
VI. CONCLUSION
The developments in transnational human rights litigation since 2001 are wide-
ranging and far-reaching. Accordingly, the future is unclear. Litigation under
the ATS will continue to develop cautiously, having now had the (relative)
benefit of the US Supreme Court's endorsement and direction. The normative
specificity requirements spelled out in Sosa, it can be surmised, will lead to
fuller arguments on and greater judicial scrutiny of international legal sources,
particularly with regard to customary and peremptory norms. On this issue,
both the bench and bar will continue to rely on sound legal scholarship to assist
them in identifying the international norms that give rise to a cause of action at
common law.
Some of the common objections against transnational human rights
litigation have been deflated by the Sosa decision. It is sometimes claimed that
human rights are too significant for the political identity of nationally defined
communities or too politically charged to be enforced by foreign states'
judiciaries.25 In the same vein, it is also argued that the judicialization of
international human rights defeats the effectiveness of the political process and
248. Arar v. Ashcrofi, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), affed (2008) 532 F.3d 157 (2d. Cir.
2008).
249. Arar, supra note 29 and accompanying text.
250. See Jan Klabbers, "Doing the Right Thing? Foreign Tort Law and Human Rights" in
Torture as Tort, supra note 2, 553.
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unnecessarily risks straining foreign relations.251 In upholding the ATS's
applicability, the majority in Sosa addressed the politically charged nature of
transnational human rights claims as follows:
It is one thing for American courts to enforce constitutional limits on our own state
and federal governments' power, but quite another to consider suits under rules that
would go so far as to claim a limit on the power of foreign governments over their
own citizens, and to hold that a foreign government or its agent has transgressed
those limits. Yet modern international law is very much concerned with just such
questions, and apt to stimulate calls for vindicating private interests in [transnational
human rights] cases.
252
In the court's view, human rights have been transformed into law by the
community of nations and find expression in the common law. Accordingly,
determinations as to whether that law has been breached properly lie with the
judiciary. Transnational human rights litigation is premised on the principle
that Chief Justice Coke invoked in Dr. Bonham s Case253 and that Chief Justice
Marshall defended in Marbury v. Madison, namely, that "it is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.' 252 That is not
to say, however, that courts should not refrain from exercising their jurisdiction
in claims where political questions are inextricable from the legal ones. On this
connection, the Sosa court stated that determinations regarding the actionability of
an international norm at common law necessarily require that due consideration
be given to both the judicial policy of case-specific deference to the opinion of
the political branches and the practical ramifications of making the civil remedy
available. 2 ' Likewise, upon remanding Mitchell et. al to the Queen's Court for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeal stated the following:
[The] fact that a civil claim was being brought against an official or agent of a foreign
state in respect of conduct in that state, and the sensitivity of any adjudication by the
251. See e.g. Curtis A. Bradley, "The Cost of International Human Rights Litigation" (2001) 2
Chicago J. Int'l L. 457; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, "The Current Illegitimacy
of International Human Rights Litigation" (1997) 66 Fordham L. Rev. 319.
252. Sosa, supra note 32 at 727.
253. Dr. Bonham's Case, (1610) 8 Co. Rep. 107, 77 E.R. 638 (C.P.).
254. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 at 177 (1803).
255. Sosa, supra note 32 at 733. See also Jones,.supra note 29 at para. 81, which notes that the
political sensitivity of adjudication should rightly feature as an important factor in any
decision whether or not to exercise jurisdiction.
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courts of another state upon such an issue, would rightly feature as important factors
in any decision whether or not to exercise any such jurisdiction. Even in a case where
service can be effected within the jurisdiction, the English court has a general power
to decline or stay the exercise of its jurisdiction on grounds that it is an inappropriate
forum. 256
Along with state immunity, doctrines of justiciability such as forum non
conveniens and act of state will continue to condition future developments in
transnational human rights litigation and will properly do so as long as they take
full account of the evolving interaction between international human rights law
and doctrines that serve to shield states and other actors from accountability.
256. Jones, ibid. at para. 81.
